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ABSTRACT 
 Explicit incorporation of social and organizational factors into Level 1 Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) has been theoretically and methodologically improved and now is in the 
process of development for Nuclear Power Plant (NPPs) applications. The goal of this study is to 
initiate the same paradigm of research for Level 3 PRA.  Explicit incorporation of social factors, 
most specifically location-specific social factors into Level 3 PRA, can drastically affect 
decisions related to emergency planning, preparedness, and response (EPPR).  With concerns 
about population response from a radiological accident such as the one that occurred at the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011, understanding the implications of the social 
makeup of the population in the vicinity of an NPP has the potential to give decision makers 
information about the effects of their decisions.  This research proposes theoretical and 
methodological approaches to explicitly consider the social factors of the local population in 
NPP accident consequence modeling.  
In a Level 3 PRA, the MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS2) 
developed by Sandia National Laboratory, is used by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
and nuclear industry in order to estimate the damages to public health and environment in the 
case of an NPP severe accident leading to a large radiological release into the atmosphere.  The 
goal for this research is to derive and incorporate location-specific human and organizational 
factors, socio-political/ socio-economic climate, and community-specific characteristics into a 
Level 3 PRA. This has been done “externally” by the integration of MACCS2 with Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS). Esri’s ArcGIS Version 10.2 software is utilized to operationalize this 
study. A Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) methodology is also proposed as an approach to 
“internally” incorporate social risk-contributing factors into a Level 3 PRA code.  
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In this research, social vulnerability construct is used, as a surrogate for a causal model, 
to integrate social factors with a Level 3 PRA.  There have been over five decades of research 
dedicated to the development of quantifiable social vulnerability factors and models that point 
toward a prediction of consequences to a population, given a specific hazard.  Most of these 
studies have been concentrated on natural hazards; yet, none have been applied to the man-made 
hazard (i.e., radiation) related to NPPs.  This research study combines social and technical 
contextual factors with radiation and contamination hazard characteristics based on a specific 
NPP in order to advance risk assessment and management for NPP severe accidents.  Specific 
demographic information is integrated into social vulnerability and includes house value, age, 
minority status, and gender.  This social vulnerability is associated with the population’s ability 
to evacuate the area, namely to define evacuation delay time and evacuation speed within the 
population evacuation model.  
This research spans two very diverse areas of study; (1) Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) as originated in nuclear engineering, and (2) social vulnerability analysis which is 
primarily conducted in geography and the social sciences.  The contributions of this research 
include:  
1. Theoretical contributions to support applying social vulnerability frameworks to NPP 
accident consequence analysis, covered in chapter 2. This research is the first of its kind 
to bridge the gap between social vulnerability theories and nuclear power risk analysis, 
and consists of a thorough literature review spanning many diverse areas of research 
2. Methodological contributions toward combining an accident consequence code such as 
MACCS2 with the quantification of social vulnerability in the form of a social 
vulnerability index, covered in chapter 3.  This methodology has been established in 
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natural hazards research, and never in the context of probabilistic nuclear accident 
consequence codes. 
3. Methodological contributions toward the integration of an accident consequence code 
such as MACCS2 with Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to visualize risk 
information and to explicitly and externally integrate social factors with MACCS2.  This 
has been demonstrated in chapters 3 and 4. 
4. Methodological contributions to explicitly and internally merge social vulnerability 
indices with the evacuation module in MACCS2, using Bayesian Belief Network (BBN).  
This has been explained in chapter 5. 
5. Practical contributions including explicit consideration of location-specific social factors 
in Level 3 PRA that will help develop: (i) more realistic modeling of population response 
and, therefore, a more accurate estimation of NPP severe accident risk; and (ii) more 
advanced management of NPPs severe accident risk by facilitating the analysis of the 
effects of change in risk due to changes in the underlying socio-technical risk 
contributing factors.  This will certainly help advance models and applications of risk-
informed EPPR, particularly in focusing on location-specific populations who rank 
highest with respect to risk.  A further contribution is to  visualize location-specific 
radiological risk around a NPP in order to improve risk communication with the public 
and policy makers.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 This thesis contributes to the advancement of Risk-Informed Emergency Planning, 
Preparedness, and Response (EPPR).  The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has 
pushed for a risk-informed, performance-based philosophy on regulation [1], and EPPR is one 
area that has not received as much assistance from the risk-informed methods.   
 EPPR has been a topic of concern in the United States since the Three Mile Island 
incident of 1979, but especially since the Fukushima Daiichi disaster in 2011.  While there are 
some differences in the offsite response practices between Japan and the U.S., the lessons 
learned from Fukushima can be used to improve the safety of nuclear power plant operations in 
the US and around the world [2].  The research goal in this thesis is to further update EPPR 
decision-making practices by explicit incorporation of social information that is combined with 
the technical analysis of a nuclear power plant accident. 
 Chapter 1 consists of background on Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), and its 
application to Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM).  Formal definitions of RIDM and 
Emergency Preparedness (EP) are introduced, and how PRA can be integrated into the decisions 
associated with EP is detailed. 
 Chapter 2 forms the theoretical foundation for integration of nuclear accident 
consequence analysis (Level 3 PRA) and the social vulnerability construct.  The elements of an 
accident consequence analysis are detailed and the absence of social contributing factors is 
identified.  Chapter 2 also defines “hazards”, such as natural hazards, as applied to a nuclear 
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power plant and vulnerability research, and describes some of the more popular theoretical 
models. 
 Chapter 3 compares quantification methods and techniques that are used to 1) conduct a 
Level 3 PRA study, and 2) calculate a social vulnerability index.  It identifies the major accident 
consequence codes used both nationally and internationally, as well as the social factors that are 
used and quantified in social vulnerability analysis.  This chapter attempts to identify all 
potentially useful analysis methods and software tools, and to analyze their capabilities with 
respect to Level 3 PRA and emergency response analysis, and to calculate a social vulnerability 
index.  
 Chapters 4 and 5 take several social factors listed in Chapter 3, calculate a social 
vulnerability index, and integrate these factors with Level 3 PRA analysis.  Specifically, many of 
the social factors that are present in a local population and that drive the decisions of the public 
are identified and quantified, resulting in an advanced modeling technique that is more accurate 
and can provide great insight into the amount and placement of resources within a nuclear power 
plant’s emergency planning zone, and can positively influence decisions related to evacuation 
and other protection strategies.   
 Chapter 6 covers final conclusions and recommended directions for further work.  A 
roadmap of the chapters of this thesis is given in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1. Roadmap of the thesis. 
 This research spans two very diverse areas of study; Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) as used in nuclear engineering, and social vulnerability analysis, which is primarily 
conducted in geography and the social sciences.  Due to the differences in vocabulary, models, 
methodology, and tools, a thorough discussion of relevant theoretical and methodological aspects 
of both nuclear PRA and social vulnerability analysis are provided in this thesis. 
 The intended audience for this research is the nuclear PRA community, the social 
vulnerability community, or the hazards analysis community.  Since these areas of research have 
not previously been brought together in a single study, the foundational concepts will be 
comprehensively covered. 
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1.2 PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
 For the past four decades, the nuclear power industry has used Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) to quantify risk.  The WASH-1400 (Reactor Safety Study, RSS), published in 
1975 was the first attempt at a full-scope PRA to calculate NPP risk [3].  The RSS calculated risk 
to the reactor core, risk to vessel containment, and risk of radioactive release and contamination.  
The other studies developed by the US NRC that have been full-scope analyses like the RSS 
(that covered all levels of risk, from core damage to public exposure), have been NUREG-1150 
(Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants), published in 1990 
[4], and NUREG-1935 (State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA)), published 
in 2012 [5].  These three documents have defined the progression of PRA in the nuclear power 
industry.  They have each analyzed risk at all stages of accident progression, from core damage, 
to radioactive release, to ultimate consequences to the public and the environment. 
 PRA is used to quantify and analyze the risks associated with a system of systems.  The 
complexity of an NPP can be analyzed by its individual components and all the sequences of 
events that have the possibility to occur.  The most common definition of risk is the triplet 
definition, which asks [6]: 
 What can go wrong? 
 What is the likelihood?  
 What are the consequences? 
 Based on this definition, the equation to calculate risk is given by equation 1.1 [6]. 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 (𝑅) = 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 (𝑓) × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝐶)   (1.1) 
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 Kaplan and Garrick [6] suggest that equation 1.1 is misleading, considering that a low-
probability high-damage scenario would result in the same risk as a high-probability low-damage 
scenario.  Although the quantitative risk is the same for both cases, they are clearly not the same 
qualitatively.  Furthermore, if the risks being calculated in equation 1.1 were to contain multiple 
scenarios of different frequencies and consequences, resulting in a “risk curve” or distribution of 
risk, this equation would imply that risk is only the expected value or average of the curve.  In 
order to communicate risk properly, the whole curve must be considered, and it is perhaps better 
practice to think of risk as simply comprised of both frequency and consequence [6]. 
 The nuclear power industry has had a very good safety record and, as such, does not have 
a large database of reactor accidents from which to draw statistical information for system-level 
accident frequencies (i.e. Core Damage Frequency and Large Early Release) in order to use 
equation 1.1 at the system level to estimate system risk.  A probabilistic approach (i.e. PRA) was 
developed through the RSS to quantify the risk to the public from nuclear power plant (NPP) 
operations. The standard tools used to conduct PRA for an NPP are event trees (ETs) and fault 
trees (FTs).  FTs use basic Boolean logic gates, composed primarily of “AND” and “OR” gates, 
to generate logical statements about the failure of a system, called the top event.  Individual 
components, with statistical failure rates, make up both the system and the system’s FT.  Fault 
trees are deductive models in that they embody component failures that will contribute to system 
failure [7].  FTs assist in the above issue of not having statistical data for system-level nuclear 
power plant failures by using individual component failures and deductively computing the 
probabilistic failure rate of the entire system.  This is also helpful in identifying which 
components contribute most to the total risk. 
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 ETs, on the other hand, are inductive models.  This tool follows a chronological sequence 
of events, starting with an initiating event (IE) and ending with an end state [7].  End states have 
specific consequences associated with them; these can range from no plant damage to maximum 
core damage, and any other end states in-between these two extremes.  The events sequenced 
between the IE and the end states allow for multiple scenarios of event sequences to take place.  
Each event has a probability of success or failure.  The likelihood of each event is often linked to 
its own FT to estimate probability of failure.  In this regard, PRA is inherently a scenario-driven 
process.   
 
Figure 1.2. Example of a fault tree connected to an event tree [8]. 
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 A simplified example of a coupled FT and ET is shown in Figure 1.2.  The result of FT 
and ET construction is the ability to break down a complex technical system such as a nuclear 
power plant into its most important systems, subsystems, and individual components for 
estimation of total plant failure.  Different sequences of “events” or system failures can be used 
to determine the ultimate risk of total plant failure. 
 PRA studies also require other special analysis tools such as common-cause failure 
(CCF) analysis and human reliability analysis (HRA).  CCF analysis models dependent failure 
mechanisms between basic components that create a “significant increase in overall system or 
facility risk” [9].  HRA models human error, and is an essential tool in quantifying human 
actions contributing to risk.  This contribution may come in the form of errors leading to 
unavailability of equipment, initiating events, or failure of safety functions or systems [10]. 
 PRA can also directly incorporate uncertainties into consequence results.  Model 
uncertainty and parameter uncertainty can be both incorporated and propagated from the source 
of the uncertainty to a distribution of risk as an end result.  These uncertainties can be 
categorized as either aleatory uncertainty or epistemic uncertainty.  Aleatory uncertainty refers to 
the natural variations in a parameter that are essentially uncontrollable.  An example is averaging 
weather over a long period of time.   This results in diminishing the short-term weather 
fluctuations that appear unpredictable [11].  Epistemic uncertainty results from a lack of 
knowledge about the parameter.  An example is the uncertainty about the accuracy of collected 
data, since this could be resolvable by having more information and a more advanced data 
collection system.  Theoretically, an increase in the study of the system will reduce the epistemic 
uncertainty.  Unless a substantial effort is made in the quantification process, these two types of 
uncertainty may be indistinguishable [11]. 
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 PRA has many advantages.  It provides insights and a greater understanding of the design 
flaws and abnormal modes of operation, as well as identifies areas for reduction of operation and 
maintenance costs while still meeting safety standards, and still leaves room for updating 
conservative regulatory requirements [9].  This type of analysis is more comprehensive than 
traditional deterministic methods due to the consideration of multiple failures and accident 
scenarios.  PRA helps in integrating different disciplines such as engineering and behavioral 
sciences in the study of human reliability [12].   
 One of the most beneficial aspects of PRA is that it gives decision makers information to 
make decisions about complex technical systems by identifying dominant accident scenarios and 
critical contributing factors to risk [12].  Not only dominant scenarios in an ET, but also 
components that are significant contributors to those scenarios in FTs can be identified [10]. 
1.3 PRA LEVELS 
 While nuclear safety is rooted in a defense-in-depth strategy [13], PRA plays a huge role 
in determining the actual amount of risk that is present by operating a nuclear reactor on land 
near other industries, schools, and homes.  The analysis of risk to the public is an immense 
undertaking, and so the problem is divided into three levels of analysis based on barriers to 
release of radioactive material to the public.  Figure 1.3 shows that fuel rod cladding, 
confinement, and emergency response create natural divisions for this complex PRA problem. 
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Figure 1.3. Radioactivity barriers that form the basis for dividing PRA into different levels [13]. 
 The PRA Procedures Guide (NUREG/CR-2300) conceptualized the division of PRA into 
three different levels to form concentrated areas of study [14]: 
 Level 1: The assessment of plant failures (hardware, software, and human) leading to 
core damage.  The result is the determination of core damage frequency (CDF). 
 Level 2: The assessment of containment response leading to the determination of release 
frequencies.  The result is Large Early Release Frequency (LERF), which includes 
information on release severity. 
 Level 3: The assessment of off-site consequences leading to estimates of risks to the 
public.  The result is a creation of risk curves related to prompt fatalities and latent cancer 
fatalities.  
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 NPP license holders have plant-specific Level 1 PRA to maintain risk information about 
their plant [15].  Level 1 PRA is noted as a systems analysis in NUREG-2300.  These PRAs 
receive information regarding initiating events (IEs) and, through the use of scenario 
development, produce a probability of reactor core damage (Core Damage Frequency, CDF).  
System accident sequences are developed, and this level of PRA does not attempt to define the 
actual consequences of failure (core damage) to any extent further than calculating the likelihood 
of core damage.  There is no differentiation between severe and less-severe consequences, only 
whether an end state results in core damage [16]. 
 Level 1 PRA is the most practiced and widely-used level of PRA within the commercial 
nuclear power industry.  Both regulation (through licensing decisions), and license holders 
(maintaining daily operations), use Level 1 models to perform system risk calculations to 
determine plant-specific CDF, and actions are put into place when the baseline CDF for that 
plant is increased due to license changes [17], inspection findings [18], or plant incidents [19].  
The results of Level 1 PRA (core damage frequency) are used as the main source of risk 
information in regulatory decision making as will be discussed in the next section. 
 Level 2 PRA expands upon a level 1 systems analysis and also considers containment 
response to an accident sequence.  This level of PRA predicts the time and mode of containment 
failure, which also specifies which radionuclides are present at the time of release to the 
environment, called the source term [16].  Level 2 PRA has the ability to categorize different 
accident sequences in terms of risk (both frequency and consequence) based on the severity of 
their release to the environment [16].  The mirror of CDF in Level 2 PRA is Large Early Release 
Frequency (LERF). 
11 
 
 Level 3 PRA uses the source term generated from Level 2 and analyzes the transport of 
radionuclides through the environment.  The goal of a Level 3 PRA is to assess the public-health, 
environmental, and economic consequences of an accident that escapes the radiological 
containment of the plant [16].  This level of PRA calculates the final consequences to the public, 
and, therefore, completes the risk calculation as given in equation 1.1.  Level 3 PRA is explained 
in detail in Appendix A of this thesis. 
 Figure 1.4 shows the processes required for all levels of PRA for a nuclear power plant. 
 
Figure 1.4. Risk assessment procedure [16]. 
As Figure 1.4 indicates, human reliability is a part of the systems analysis conducted in Level 1 
PRA [16].  An update to Figure 1.4, produced in 1983 by the NRC, is that HRA has also started 
to bridge into Level 2 PRA [20].  However, there is currently no explicit incorporation of human 
factors during the emergency phase of an evacuation scenario in Level 3 PRA. 
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 Many PRA studies involve Level 1 PRA only, as it gives good information about the 
operating systems in place at the plant.  Some extend the analysis to Level 2, but this requires 
much more time to complete.  The difference between a single level PRA and a full-scope PRA 
study is that a full-scope PRA is continuous from the beginning of Level 1 to the end of Level 3.  
The NRC has developed three major full-scope PRA studies [3, 4, 5] and a full-scope PRA 
project is currently under way [21]. 
 Also, note that while the majority of full-scope Level 3 assessments have to do with 
operating light-water reactor accidents, it is also applicable to reprocessing plants and spent fuel 
pools where there is still a risk of radiation for the public.  Development of PRA for Advanced 
Light-Water Reactors (ALWRs) is also being conducted [22]. 
1.4 RISK-INFORMED DECISION MAKING 
 In 1995, the NRC issued a policy statement titled, “Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Methods in Nuclear Regulatory Activities” [23].  Within this policy, the conclusion regarding the 
expanded use of PRA had four points: 
1. The use of PRA should be increased in all regulatory matters to the furthest extent 
supported by current PRA methods that complement the NRC’s deterministic approach 
and support the NRC’s traditional defense-in-depth philosophy. 
2. PRA should be used in regulatory matters to reduce unnecessary conservatism associated 
with current regulatory requirements, guides, license commitments, and staff practices. 
3. PRA evaluations in support of regulatory decisions should be as realistic as practical, and 
appropriate supporting data should be publicly available for review. 
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4. The NRC’s safety goals for NPPs shall incorporate appropriate considerations of 
uncertainties. 
This document changed the intended process for decision making by forcing consideration for 
risk, uncertainty, and PRA in many core programs for which the NRC is responsible. 
 The NRC has taken this policy very seriously, and has driven the nuclear power industry 
to embrace a risk-informed approach to licensing and regulation.  This integrated decision 
making has been widely incorporated into U.S. nuclear safety systems and procedures.  In fact, 
Level 1 PRA is used as a prime motivator for backing license changes and updates.  Some of the 
more significant Regulatory Guides that demonstrate and incorporate risk-informed decision 
making are given in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1. Examples of risk-informed decision making in regulatory guides. 
Regulatory Guide  Original Draft Date Description 
RG 1.174: An Approach for Using 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment in 
Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-
Specific Changes to the Licensing 
Basis 
July 1998 Streamlines recommended methods 
and provides direction for using risk 
information to support licensing basis 
changes for regulatory review and 
approval. 
RG 1.177: An Approach for Plant-
Specific, Risk-Informed Decision 
making: Technical Specifications 
August 2009 Describes methods and 
recommendations for using risk 
information to assess proposed 
technical specification changes and 
their impact on the risk associated with 
plant operation. 
RG 1.178: An Approach for Plant-
Specific Risk-Informed Decision 
making for In-service Inspection of 
Piping 
September 2003 Use of PRA findings and risk insights 
for decisions on a plant’s inspection 
program for piping. 
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RG 1.200: An Approach for 
determining the Technical 
Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment Results for Risk-
Informed Activities 
June 2008 Describes an approach for determining 
whether a PRA is sufficient to provide 
confidence in the results to be used in 
regulatory decision making.  Combined 
guidance and standards from nuclear 
industry organizations such as NFPA, 
ASME/ANS, and NEI. 
RG 1.201: Guidelines for 
Categorizing Structures, Systems, 
and Components in Nuclear Power 
Plants According to their Safety 
Significance 
January 2006 Establishes a regulatory framework for 
establishing safety significance of 
structures, systems, and components 
(SSCs) based on a risk-informed 
process to remove low significance 
SSCs from special treatment 
requirements. 
RG 1.205: Risk-Informed, 
Performance-Based Fire Protection 
for Existing Light-water Nuclear 
Power Plants 
September 2004 Provides guidance for transitioning 
from a current fire protection program 
to one based in PRA through NFPA 
805, “Performance-Based Standard for 
Fire Protection for Light-Water 
Reactor Electric Generating Plants.” 
Table 1.1 (cont.) 
 The NRC has documented the applicability and quality of using PRA in regulation 
through RG 1.200.  The relationship among this Regulatory Guide and others is given in Figure 
1.5. 
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Figure 1.5. Relationship of Regulatory Guide 1.200 to other risk-informed guidance [24]. 
 The idea behind Figure 1.5 is that for each regulatory application, there is a specific 
Regulatory Guide to provide guidance on the base PRA used for decision making.  If the 
technical adequacy of the base PRA in the application-specific RG is in doubt, each RG will 
reference RG 1.200 to determine the technical adequacy of the base PRA [24]. 
 In 1998, the NRC published Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, An Approach for Using 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the 
Licensing Basis.  This RG was one of the first guides for using PRA in a decision making 
process.  This was specific to license amendments, but led the way for integrating PRA to help 
guide regulatory decision making.  This approach is shown in Figure 1.6. 
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Figure 1.6.  Principles of Risk-Informed Integrated Decision Making, modified from [17] 
 Risk-informed decision making is different from risk-based decision making, in that only 
one of the inputs to the decision making process is risk.  Risk-based decision making would be 
solely based on numerical risk-values, and other aspects have little or no significance [25].  In a 
risk informed process, risk information is used and can affect the ultimate decision, but so are 
previously set regulations, defense-in-depth measures, deterministically-set safety margins, and 
performance monitoring. 
 As figure 1.6 implies, the source of risk information that is used in regulatory decision 
making, specifically through the NRC’s decision making framework, is the contribution of the 
proposed decision to CDF and LERF.  Naturally, CDF and LERF are the quantifiable 
consequences from Level 1 and Level 2 PRA studies, so it is possible to change parameters 
within a Level 1 PRA and see what effect with regard to risk contribution the change has.  
 Block 4 in figure 1.6 specifies that an integral part of the decision making process should 
include a consideration to the contribution to risk.  This is quantified through core damage 
frequency (CDF), large early release frequency (LERF), and quantitative health objectives 
Integrated 
Decision Making
2. Maintain 
Defense-in-
Depth 
Philosophy
3. Maintain 
Safety Margins
5. Monitor 
Performance
1. Comply with 
Regulations
4.Risk Decrease, 
Neutral, or 
Small Increase 
(CDF or LERF)
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(QHOs).  QHOs determine whether the NRC’s safety goals are being met.  Two QHOs are 
applicable in the US [25, p. 3]: 
1. “The risk to an average individual in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant of prompt 
fatalities that might result from reactor accidents should not exceed one-tenth of one 
percent (0.1 per cent) of the sum of prompt-fatality risks resulting from other accidents to 
which members of the US population are generally exposed.” 
2. “The risk to the population in the area near a nuclear power plant of cancer fatalities 
that might result from nuclear power plant operation should not exceed one-tenth of one 
percent (0.1 per cent) of the sum of cancer-fatality risks resulting from all other causes.” 
 The major difference between the two QHOs above is that the first objective is individual 
risk, considered within the site boundary, while the second objective is societal risk, defined 
within a 10-mile radius of the plant [25].  QHOs are measurable by the risk calculated in a Level 
3 PRA study.  The actual objective changes with time.  Currently, the prompt fatality QHO is set 
at 5×10
-7
 per year and the cancer fatality QHO is set at 2×10
-6
 per year in the US [26]. 
 In the development of the QHOs for the NRC, it was understood that the prompt fatality 
QHO was the more controlling objective: that if the prompt fatality objective is met, the risk of 
cancer fatalities would be much lower than its respective QHO [26].  This is seen in the 
quantitative objectives above.  
 Therefore, CDF and LERF are considered to be risk information, which is used in a 
regulatory risk-informed decision making framework as seen in block 4 of Figure 1.6. There is 
an ASME standard for Level 1 and a limited Level 2 PRA for full-power operations that were 
originally proposed in 2002 [27].  There are no ASME or ANS standards for Level 2 PRAs 
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beyond the determination of LERF, or any standards for extending the PRA to Level 3 [28].  For 
example, according to the 2009 ASME standards, Level 1 PRA must contain [29]: 
 Initiating events analysis, 
 Accident sequence analysis, 
 Success criteria analysis, 
 Systems analysis, 
 Human reliability analysis, 
 Data analysis, and 
 Quantification 
 Due to the fact that CDF and LERF are the main measures of risk in the risk-informed 
decision making process, much work has been done to ensure consistent, quality quantification 
of these terms.  However, even the NRC has stated that before individual plant PRA, “there was 
thought to be a need to expand PRAs to Level 3; however, the current emphasis is to support 
decision making in terms of CDF and LERF” [28].   
 This does not mean that highly useful risk information that quantifies prompt and latent 
cancer risks cannot be garnered in a Level 3 PRA.  The results from Level 3 PRA are actually the 
true measure of risk of operating a nuclear power plant and, the use of LERF as a surrogate, 
while it helps to shorten the analysis, may miss many aspects of the risk calculation that a Level 
3 study would identify.  “At some point it will be necessary to expand PRAs to Level 3 to enable 
risk-informed regulation to expand into these areas.” [28]. 
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1.5 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
 The application of risk information that this research endeavors to extend is toward 
emergency preparedness.  Emergency preparedness is most often associated with Level 3 PRA 
because it is so closely linked to emergency response.  However, after discussing the different 
aspects considered in nuclear emergency preparedness, connections to all levels of PRA can be 
seen. 
 The overall objective of emergency preparedness (EP), as defined by NUREG 0654, is 
“to provide dose savings (and in some cases immediate life saving) for a spectrum of accidents 
that could produce offsite doses in excess of Protective Action Guides (PAGs)” [30].  A PAG is  
defined as “the projected dose to reference man, or other defined individual, from an unplanned 
release of radioactive material at which a specific protective action to reduce or avoid that dose is 
recommended” [31].  A PAG is a dose that is projected in order to determine appropriate 
protective actions to include shelter-in-place (SIP), prophylactic iodide pills, or evacuation. 
 While the NUREG 0654 definition seems to cover a wide range of possibilities to curtail 
dose to the public, the definition of EP is not specific as to how the dose savings are achieved.  
The individual elements of the EP program contained in NUREG 0654 must be thoroughly read 
in order to understand what is meant to “provide dose savings” from the provided definition of 
EP.  The NRC provides a public objective on their website which states that EP is “to ensure that 
the nuclear power plant operator is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect public 
health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency” [32].  This definition of EP is more 
specific, and actually assigns responsibility to the plant to ensure the public is protected in the 
case of an NPP accident. 
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 One can further expand this definition of EP to actually include emergency planning.   
Planning, training, and prepositioning of equipment are all part of emergency preparedness [33].  
Even though emergency planning can be considered as a part of emergency preparedness, 
emergency response certainly is not.  Response is the phase of an emergency that only exists 
when there is an actual emergency.  The event of a NPP accident is what is considered when 
defining emergency response.  Figure 1.7 illustrates a “disaster cycle” that is common in natural 
disaster research [34].  It implies that the time both before and the time after a disaster (in this 
case a radiological release to the public) is spent in efforts to minimize the effects.  Both 
mitigation and preparedness are phases that happen before the disaster, and response and 
recovery happen during/after the disaster.  However, once fully recovered (and in most cases, 
during the latter part of recovery) mitigative strategies for the next disaster are put back in place.   
 
Figure 1.7. The disaster cycle [34]. 
 The major elements considered as parts of EP in nuclear emergency management are 
discussed below.  NUREG 0396 [30], published in 1978, established the technical basis for 
emergency planning.  NUREG 0654 [37], published in 1980, contains the criteria for emergency 
response plans and preparedness.  The elements of EP described in the following sections are 
introduced in NUREG 0396, and the requirements dictated in NUREG 0654. 
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1.5.1 PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDES 
 The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) considered four principles in 
establishing values for Protective Action Guides (PAGs) [31]: 
1. Acute effects on public health, such as immediate fatalities and radiation sickness due to 
radiation exposure, should be avoided. 
2. The risk of delayed effects on public health, including latent cancer, should not exceed 
upper bounds that are both reasonably achievable and adequately protective of public 
health under emergency conditions. 
3. PAGs should not be higher than justified due to cost considerations and overall health 
effects.  Any reduction of risk to public health achievable at acceptable cost should be 
carried out. 
4. Regardless of principles 1.3, the risk to health from a protective action should not exceed 
the risk to health from the dose that is being avoided. 
PAGs are based on the projected dose to an area or population and the early, intermediate, or late 
phase of an emergency.  PAGs help to identify which protective actions should be carried out. 
1.5.2 EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE 
 1978 was the first year that the concept of a planning area around a nuclear power plant 
was introduced  in NUREG 0396, and this same document is still used as a basis for emergency 
planning.  Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) are “designated as the areas for which planning is 
recommended to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in 
the event of an accident” [30].  EPZs set the boundary for emergency planning.  Two different 
EPZs were established, one known as the “plume exposure” EPZ, approximately 10 miles from 
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the NPP site, and the other, the “ingestion exposure” EPZ, roughly 50 miles from the site [30].  
These zones define guidance, and generic radii around the NPP.  Each site should have EPZs that 
are adjusted to local populations, topography, land use, etc. [35].  A typical plume exposure EPZ 
map is shown in Figure 1.8.  The various colors represent different municipalities within the 10 
mile EPZ, with the plant at the center. 
 
Figure 1.8. Typical 10 mile Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ map [36]. 
 NUREG 0396 calculated a conditional probability of dose exceedance calculation based 
on a 5×10
-5
 (# /Rx-yr) core melt frequency.  These curves are shown in Figure 1.9.  This 
provided the basis for the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ because projected doses did not exceed 
PAG levels [37]. 
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Figure 1.9. Conditional (core melt of 5×10
-5
) probability of exceeding whole body dose [30]. 
The 50-mile ingestion exposure EPZ is based on a PAG of 1.5 rem to the infant thyroid due to 
dairy ingestion [37]. 
 EPZs assist decision makers in identifying which recommended protective actions 
(evacuation or shelter-in-place) are appropriate for each area around the plant.  Many times, 
evacuation is ordered for the population within 2 miles of the NPP, and 5 miles downwind [37].   
1.5.3 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS 
 NUREG 0654 separates plant emergencies into four distinct categories, with varying 
levels of response required.  In order of least to most significant, NPP emergencies are classified 
as [37]: 
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 Notification of Unusual Event 
o Potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant, but no releases of 
radioactive material is expected. 
 Alert 
o Actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant, and 
any releases are expected to be small. 
 Site Area Emergency 
o Actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the 
public; releases not expected to exceed EPA PAGs except near site boundary. 
 General Emergency 
o Actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss 
of containment integrity; releases are expected to exceed PAGs offsite. 
By setting Notification of Unusual Event and Alert classifications, notification of events that 
could lead to serious accidents is performed early and promptly.  Site area emergencies are not 
indicative of core damage, but emergency personnel are mobilized.  When general emergencies 
are declared, the public is expected to shelter-in-place and await direction to evacuate either 
before or after the plume passes [37].   
1.5.4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS 
 Emergency classifications are declared based on Emergency Action Levels (EALs).  
These levels give the plant operator clear and quantitative conditions that are necessary to 
declare a specific emergency classification.  As an example, the following EALs illustrate the 
progression of a common indicator of potential core damage (loss of power) from an Unusual 
Event all the way to General Emergency [37]: 
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 Notification of Unusual Event: Loss of offsite power or loss of onsite AC power 
capability. 
 Alert: Loss of offsite power and loss of all onsite power. 
 Site Area Emergency: Loss of offsite power and loss of onsite AC power for more than 
15 minutes. 
 General Emergency: Failure of offsite and onsite power along with total loss of 
emergency feedwater makeup capability for several hours. 
EALs were originally established in 1980 (NUREG 0654), and several studies have sought to 
determine their validity, including internally by the NRC [38]. 
1.6 APPLICATION OF PRA IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
 The elements described above that are essential to EP in the nuclear power industry are 
directly expressed in the response phase of a nuclear accident.  The response phase of an 
emergency is readily seen in evacuation modeling within Level 3 PRA and, therefore, many of 
the elements of EP have connections with Level 3 PRA.  It is clear, however, that certain aspects 
such as EALs and emergency classifications have been determined far in advance of the response 
phase and the scope of Level 3 PRA.  It is a claim in this research that EP is a common 
influencing factor in all levels of PRA, and that EP can benefit from all levels of PRA as well. 
 NUREG 0396 discusses the rationale for the EP planning basis.  It clearly states that even 
though a risk-informed EP could give a solid foundation for analyzing the risk that could be 
mitigated by advanced planning, the risk perception of an operating NPP is much higher than it 
is for other risks that are better understood by the public.  This resulted in a concern that the EP 
planning basis should be greater than other disasters that are more accepted and understood by 
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the public.  The actual basis behind EP planning is based on consequence calculations from a 
spectrum of postulated accidents [30].  In essence, this provided the ability to compare relative 
risk within the confines of all accident scenarios applicable to NPPs, and would assist in 
identifying spatial and temporal bounds to the EP planning decision making process. 
 As previously described, risk information can come in the form of CDF, LERF, or QHOs.  
CDF does not have any exact consequence associated with it, only frequency of damage, and is, 
therefore, not actual risk.  LERF is also mostly just a frequency, but source terms generated from 
a Level 2 PRA can be categorized in terms of severity for a better measure of risk. Comparing 
prompt fatalities and latent cancer risks to the QHOs is the final and most accurate risk 
quantification, but is not usually used as risk information for decision making because of the 
increase in time and resources for analysis. 
 The assumption, then, is that the scope of PRA study depends on what element of EP the 
analyst wants to better understand and potentially change, based on risk.  Several example 
applications of risk informed emergency preparedness are demonstrated in the following 
sections. 
1.6.1 RISK INFORMED EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONES (2005) 
 In Taiwan, EPZs must be established prior to operation and reevaluated every five years.  
A 2005 study used MACCS2 (a Level 3 PRA code discussed in chapter 3 of this research) to 
determine the effective dose equivalent, thyroid dose, individual risk, and societal risk for 
various categories of nuclear accidents [39].  The risk quantified by MACCS2 was then 
compared to the relevant PAG to establish a conservative EPZ for the area.  It was found that the 
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previously established EPZs for operating NPPs in Taiwan were adequate to protect the public 
and keep anticipated risk below regulatory requirements [39]. 
1.6.2 RISK INFORMED PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGIES (2007) 
 A 2007 study conducted by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) also used MACCS2 
to evaluate the risk associated with different EP elements.  This study used early fatalities, cancer 
fatalities, and early injury risks as risk metrics for applying a risk informed approach to EP.  The 
EP elements focused on in this study were protective actions, and their relative risk-reduction 
effectiveness [40].  Results of this study showed that many intuitive assumptions about 
emergency response are true: that increased distance from the NPP provides significant reduction 
in any protected action that is performed, that increased speed and decreased delay time during 
evacuation greatly reduces risk, and that breathing masks can reduce internal exposure [40].  
However, these claims were quantified and it was demonstrated that different risk-reduction 
techniques could be used in a more informed manner than they have been in the past. 
1.6.3 RISK INFORMED EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (2013) 
 The NRC has analyzed some of its own assumptions in the creation of EP elements.  A 
recent study used Level 1 PRA to determine the risk significance of different EALs.  This, in 
turn, has the ability to confirm or deny the emergency classification with which each EAL is 
associated [38].  Risk was quantified using a risk surrogate of conditional core damage 
probability (CCDP) for each EAL.  The results from this PRA study showed that the general 
trend of risk and EAL associated with an emergency classification was positive.  A higher 
classification corresponded to a higher CCDP value [38]. Statistical outliers were also identified 
and recommendations for modifying the EAL or the associated emergency classification were 
given. 
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 As the three examples of risk informed EP show, Level 1, 2, or 3 PRA can be used to 
help the decision making process applicable to EP.  Since a full-scope Level 3 analysis would 
provide the most comprehensive risk information, it is the best choice but requires much more 
time and many more resources to perform.  However, the benefit outweighs the resource cost 
required to perform such an analysis, since risk insights on all elements of EP can potentially be 
identified and complete risk information is used rather than surrogates (CDF and LERF). 
1.7 MOTIVATION OF THIS RESEARCH 
The goal of this research is to explicitly incorporate location-specific social contributing 
factors into Level 3 PRA.  There has been significant progress in Level 1 PRA and the explicit 
incorporation of social factors into Level 1 PRA. Explicit modeling of human error (at the 
individual level) has been done in Level 1 PRA by utilizing Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
techniques. Explicit incorporation of social and organizational failure mechanisms associated 
with human errors in Level 1 PRA has also been conducted by researchers over the past two 
decades in diverse fields of application such as nuclear power, aviation, chemical processing, and 
space [42-62].  
 Regarding the location-specific incorporation of factors into PRA, although fault trees 
and event trees implicitly consider location, explicit inclusion of space in PRA Level 1 has not 
been advanced [63].  Quite recently, there has been a first-of-a kind explicit incorporation of 
location in PRA. This incorporation was an effort to consider location-specific weld failure 
frequencies when calculating the frequency of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), as part of an 
Integrated PRA (I-PRA) [64] framework in the risk-informed resolution of Generic Safety Issue 
191 (GSI-191) for nuclear power plants [65]. An on-going research study is focusing on the 
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development of location-specific LOCA frequencies associated with non-piping components 
[66]. 
 Although research has been extensively done on the advancement of Level 1 PRA and on 
the explicit incorporation of social factors into Level 1 PRA, Level 3 PRA and consequently 
risk-informed EP are still immature. The EPRI study [40] explains the lack of risk information 
used in decision making for EP very well.  The technical basis and guidance behind current EP 
procedures is almost four decades old.  Many advancements in both accident mitigation and risk 
assessment tools have been made and much experience has been gained since the creation of 
these documents.  Furthermore, a risk informed method to decision making has become the 
NRC’s standard approach to regulation based on the publication of RG 1.174 and their public 
statements on the use of PRA. 
 While expanding the risk informed approach to decision making, specific elements of EP 
have been identified as needing more risk information in order to be better assured of their 
effectiveness.  Most prominently, and through the remainder of this research, it has been 
determined that there is no modeling technique that has been used to explicitly integrate social 
and behavioral factors in emergency response modeling within Level 3 PRA computer codes.   
There is no claim in this research that social information is not considered when 
modeling response behavior in previous Level 3 PRA studies; however, the consideration of 
social factors is implicit rather than explicit.   Research is conducted in the nuclear power 
industry to accurately calculate ETEs based on road loading, time of year or time of day, and 
phone interviews to calculate how long an evacuation would take.  Every licensed power reactor 
in the US is required to calculate a site-specific ETE [41].  The social factors considered here, 
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and thus far in the nuclear industry, are implicitly considered in the development of site-specific 
ETEs.   
While social information is implicitly accounted for in the determination of evacuation 
parameters for each site through evacuation time estimate (ETE) studies, the social factors are 
neither location-specific nor explicitly incorporated. The lack of explicit and location-specific 
incorporation of social, political, and community information provides little assurance of 
accurate risk quantification from a Level 3 PRA because of potentially inaccurate response 
modeling.  For example, evacuation efficiency is highly location specific and social- and 
behavioral-dependent.  If the population performance is not modeled realistically during an 
evacuation, then the time, resources, and decisions that were made based on the outputs of these 
models may be erroneous.  In addition, without explicit modeling of social contributing factors, 
conducting a comprehensive root cause analysis and managing risk is not possible. A 
comprehensive risk management requires explicit modeling of underlying socio-technical risk 
contributing factors and identifying their causal paths of influences on risk in order to prioritize 
the important risk factors and to control them by mitigating the risk sources and/or by blocking 
their paths of influence.  
 This research attempts to explicitly consider the social factors of the location-specific 
population around a NPP in order to help evaluate the effect of EP changes due to changes in the 
socio-technical risk contributing factors, and therefore to assist in risk management and decision 
making. 
1.8 CONTRIBUTIONS 
 Contributions of this research study can be categorized into three groups: 
31 
 
1) Theoretical Contributions: 
a. Development of theoretical foundations on how and why social vulnerability 
constructs and frameworks could be adopted and implemented to an NPP accident 
consequence analysis. This research is the first of its kind to bridge the gap 
between social vulnerability theories and nuclear power risk analysis.  Similar 
studies have been conducted for other man-made, technological hazards such as 
chemical-industry parks [67], but almost all are concerned with natural hazards.  
A thorough review of literature supports this contribution. 
2) Methodological Contributions: 
a. Combining the results of an accident consequence code (MACCS2) with the 
quantification of social vulnerability in the form of a social vulnerability index 
(SVI). 
b. Integrating the results of an accident consequence code (MACCS2) with 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to visualize risk information and to 
explicitly and externally incorporate local social factors into MACCS2.  
c. Explicitly and internally merging social vulnerability indices with evacuation 
module in MACCS2 using Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). 
3) Practical Contributions:  
a. Explicit consideration of location-specific social factors in Level 3 PRA that will 
help develop: 
i. More realistic modeling of population response and, therefore, more 
accurate estimation of NPP severe accident risk. 
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ii. More advanced management of NPPs severe accident risk by facilitating 
the analysis of the effects of change in risk due to changes in the 
underlying socio-technical risk contributing factors.  This will certainly 
help advance models and applications of risk-informed EPPR, particularly 
in focusing on location-specific populations who rank highest with respect 
to risk. 
b. Visualizing location-specific radiological risk around an NPP that will improve 
risk communication with public and policy makers. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 The objective of a Level 3 Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) in the operation of a 
nuclear power plant is to estimate the risk to public health and safety.  This risk is quantified in 
terms of early fatalities and latent cancers, as well as by the environmental and economic risks 
typically quantified as a monetary value. The NRC has established these guidelines in its 
Quantitative Health Objectives (QHO) [1].   Ultimately, the input into a Level 3 PRA is the 
output from Level 2 (LERF), and the results demonstrate how the release from the plant will 
affect public health and safety.  
 Chapter 1 of this thesis gave a synopsis of all three levels of PRA in the nuclear power 
industry.  The first section of this chapter references Appendix A, which contains all relevant 
theoretical aspects of a Level 3 PRA study.  The second part of this chapter will introduce social 
vulnerability:  stating its definition and fundamental concepts.  The conclusion of this chapter 
will theoretically demonstrate how social vulnerability is influenced by the social makeup of the 
population surrounding an NPP which will, in turn, affect the consequences to the public from a 
nuclear accident.   
2.1 LEVEL 3 PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT ELEMENTS 
In 1975, the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) was concerned with human exposure to 
released radiation and contamination and the subsequent health effects from the radiation.  
Meteorological and demographic information at the time was used to “calculate the expected 
radiation pathways and the effects on the nearby residents [2].”  The goal for this first attempt to 
use PRA was to remove as much over-conservatism in assumptions and point estimates for 
parameters in deterministic equations as possible, and to be more realistic by applying 
uncertainty analysis and using probabilistic scenarios.   
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The basic tools for PRA are Event Trees (or Event Sequence Diagrams) and Fault Trees.  
The Event Tree starts with Initiating Events (IEs) and systematically develops all significant 
scenarios based on the successes and failures of different events following the IE.  The events in 
an Event Tree can be human failures, failure of safety systems, or emergency decisions.  These 
event sequences result in multiple end states, each with varying levels of consequence.  An 
example Event Sequence Diagram (ESD) is presented in Figure 2.1 as a representation of what a 
Level 3 PRA would look like.  
 
Figure 2.1. Event Sequence Diagram of a Level 3 PRA. 
 This is the most simplistic ESD, with only one event.  In Level 1 and Level 2 PRAs, this 
center event is broken down into more specific and detailed events, such as the time for reactor 
SCRAM, Emergency Core Cooling System, and the Containment Spray System.  Nuclear safety 
is fundamentally based on a defense-in-depth philosophy, so identifying and sequencing the 
actions and safety systems responsible that leads to core damage (the scope of Level 1 PRA) or 
to radiological release (the scope of Level 2 PRA), are more apparent because they are based on 
the designed barriers in the nuclear plant. However, it is difficult to identify individual events, let 
alone set success and failure criteria for a time-dependent radiological release and interaction 
with the atmosphere, and calculate the various consequences to the local population that also has 
its own dynamic and complex behavior and response.  Therefore, the applications of classical 
PRA tools used for Level 3 PRA are more complicated.  It requires development of more 
advanced and Integrated PRA (I-PRA) in order to depict the dynamic behavior that emerges 
Initiator
(LERF)
PRA L3 Code
Health 
Consequences
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from the interaction of radiation progression and population behavior in an emergency situation 
[3, 4].   
The existing codes for PRA Level 3 are discussed in Chapter 3.  Theoretically, Level 3 PRA 
needs to cover four major areas [5]: 
1. Radionuclide release, transport, and deposition 
2. Evacuation modeling  
3. Exposure pathways and population dose assessment 
4. Environmental and economic consequence analysis 
As these four topics indicate, many areas of research and development are required to 
conduct a thorough and accurate Level 3 analysis.  Medical and health physics, atmospheric 
dispersion modeling, and road loading and traffic networking all contribute to a robust Level 3 
PRA.  Figure 2.2 shows the basic elements of this type of study. 
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Figure 2.2. Basic elements of probabilistic consequence analysis [5] 
 Diverse sets of input data are required for radionuclide release, local weather patterns, 
population, and land use.  These data come from reactor core content analysis, from 
meteorological data that can be collected directly on site at the NPP, from a local weather station, 
or from census data. 
 Radionuclide content, including parent and daughter isotopes through decay chains, and 
concentrations of each, will be generated either in the Level 3 analysis, or will come from the 
contents of the Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) calculated in a previous Level 2 PRA 
study.  The contents of the release are required to determine dose-conversion factors that are 
used for calculating the health and societal risk to individuals. 
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 Meteorological data are used to identify weather patterns and analyze typical 
meteorological phenomena in the area of the NPP site.  Weather data typically includes wind 
direction and speed, precipitation, and other atmospheric conditions such as wind stability or 
cloud conditions.  This information is then used to derive the way a radioactive release would be 
transported to the environment, interact with bodies of water, shielding, and precipitation, and 
eventually reach the local population. 
  Finally, data sets on the local population, the area’s economics and the environment are 
required.  Population data, mostly concerned with the total population and the local distribution 
of the population around the NPP, are typically taken from national census data.  In the United 
States, this data is collected and published every ten years and is available for public use.  This 
data also contains economic information, such as average household income.  When considering 
land use, environmental and economic information can overlap. Contamination of agricultural 
land used for growing crops and raising animals affects public health.  If products are 
contaminated, this produces economic hardships for those who lose a season’s product and, 
while the land is being decontaminated, years of land use.   There are also obvious environmental 
impacts, not only to these agricultural areas, but also to the surrounding areas, for years to come. 
 The Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, passed in 1957 and, renewed until 
2025, addresses the nuclear power industry liability within the United States.  As it stands, all 
licensed and operating NPPs are required to have liability insurance to compensate for personal 
injury and property damage.  Premiums for commercial plants are adjusted based on size, 
population density, property values, and even the likelihood of the reactor plant having an 
accident [6].  Therefore, as a cost-saving measure, there is motivation in the nuclear industry to 
calculate the consequences from a nuclear accident as accurately as possible. 
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 Appendix A contains a detailed analysis of the all the elements shown in Figure 2.2.  This 
process seems straightforward enough.  Most phenomena follow deterministic equations with 
some level of uncertainty that can be used to quantify the risk to the population more accurately.  
However, when interfacing the physical hazard of a radiological plume with the evacuation 
response from the population, even greater uncertainties rise to the surface.  Population 
evacuation does not follow any deterministic equation.  It is this problem of vulnerability that the 
next section aims to resolve. 
2.2 VULNERABILITY 
 The previous section of this chapter references Appendix A which details all major issues 
that must be considered when conducting a Level 3 PRA.  The Level 3 codes that are available 
and that will be discussed in Chapter 3, model certain aspects of accident consequence analysis 
better than others.  It is the direction of this research to show how to consider more than the 
previously-mentioned technical aspects in determining risk, not just on a deterministic, health 
physics level, but also on a higher social system level.   
 As discussed in Chapter 1, Emergency Preparedness and Level 3 PRA are very closely 
linked.  While Emergency Planning, Preparedness, and Response (EPPR) elements reside in all 
three levels of PRA, the majority of those EPPR elements are quickly seen and directly utilized 
in the response phase [25, 26].  Many of these have not been fully analyzed in a conventional 
Level 3 PRA.  The thrust of this research is toward a more explicit integration of spatially-
dependent social factors into a Level 3 PRA, and how the insights of this social integration will 
give a more realistic model of public response. 
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 Social systems rank as one of the most complex systems for applying theories and, 
ultimately, quantifying.  Generally, nuclear engineering is less concerned about the development 
of social science theories and applications, as it is much easier to simply assume that the majority 
of a population will respond similarly, no matter what the population’s social makeup is.  
However, this might lead to underestimating risk and also would result in non-realistic and non-
optimum Emergency Planning models because, without explicit incorporation of social risk 
contributing factors, there is no possibility to analyze the effects of change in consequences due 
to change in contributing factors.  Consequently, it would be difficult to identify the critical 
contributing factors and to mitigate them. NPP severe accident risk is not a frequent risk since 
we are dealing with a rare-event industry and do not have a large sample of statistical data of 
population evacuation in order to develop data-oriented judgments for EP models. Therefore, 
without having an explicit incorporation of sources of risk (both social and technical) in risk 
models, and without explicit modeling of the interactions of social and technical risk contributing 
factors, we would not be able to analyze the change in risk due to changes in the factors or due to 
their interactions within the ranges of uncertainty and availability. Explicit incorporation of 
social and organizational factors into PRA Level 1 has been theoretically and methodologically 
improved and now is in the process of development for NPP applications [27-37]. The goal of 
this study is to initiate the same paradigm of research for Level 3 PRA. 
2.2.1 VULNERABILITY BACKGROUND  
 Vulnerability studies have been conducted since the late 1940s, and were originally 
focused on identifying social indicators and mapping them to different social theories.  The most 
prominent vulnerability research started in the early 1980s and originated from universities with 
strong geography departments [12].   
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 The concept that certain demographics of people can be more or less vulnerable to a 
natural hazard is a field of study that is still evolving.  Causal modeling of social vulnerability 
phenomena has been attempted in several models described below.  The exact characteristics of 
different subgroups of a population, and how those characteristics contribute to the ultimate risk 
that a hazard poses to that subgroup, have been a point of contention since vulnerability studies 
began over four decades ago.  Nevertheless, there has been a greater emphasis on the shared geo-
spatial dimensions between physical systems and social systems in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the interactions between the two [8]. 
 After some progress in these foundational vulnerability studies in the 70s and 80s, 
researchers in civil engineering also began to contribute to the advancement of this area of 
research.  Some researchers were able to add an additional technical layer to these analyses to 
include infrastructure limitations in different areas of a city that would result in increased risk 
(this is when considering that most protective actions to mitigate the risk posed by a natural 
hazard have some aspect of evacuation involved).  This direction in vulnerability studies resulted 
in more accurate evacuation modeling with scenarios that dealt with road loading and changes to 
the built environment, such as important bridges being affected by the hazard [9].  The purpose 
of conducting a vulnerability study is to identify the demographic subgroups most at risk during 
the hazard, which will be specific to different social factors and, just as importantly, the geo-
spatial location of those most at risk.   
2.2.2 DEFINITIONS 
 In order to apply a vulnerability analysis to the potential radiological hazard that a 
nuclear power plant poses to the surrounding area, standard definitions and relationships need to 
be established.  This research is the first of its kind to bridge the gap between social vulnerability 
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studies and nuclear Level 3 PRA.  Similar studies have been conducted for other man-made 
technological hazards such as chemical-industry parks [10], but almost all are concerned with 
natural hazards. 
 A hazard, as defined by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is “an 
event or physical condition that has the potential to cause fatalities, injuries, property damage, 
infrastructure damage, agricultural loss, damage to the environment, interruption of business, or 
other types of harm or loss” [11]. 
 FEMA also goes so far as to categorize types of hazards.  The two general categories are: 
Natural Hazards, and Technological Hazards [11].  Within these categories are subcategories that 
are more precise.  Natural hazards are broken down to include atmospheric hazards, geologic 
hazards, hydrologic hazards, seismic hazards, and volcanoes and wildfires.  This categorization 
is shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. Categories of hazards. 
 
Atmospheric 
 
Geologic 
 
Hydrologic 
 
Seismic 
 
Other 
Technological 
Hazards 
 Tropical 
cyclones 
 Thunderstorms 
and lightning 
 Tornadoes 
 Windstorms 
 Hailstorms 
 Snow 
Avalanches 
 Severe winter 
storms 
 Severe summer 
weather 
 Landslides 
 Land 
subsidence 
 Expansive 
soils 
 Floods  
 Storm 
surges 
 Coastal 
erosion 
 Droughts 
 Earthquakes 
 Tsunami 
events 
 Volcanoes 
 Wildfires 
 Dam 
failures 
 Fires 
 Hazardous 
materials 
events 
 Nuclear 
accidents 
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 Even though “nuclear accidents” are specifically listed as a technological hazard, there 
has been very little development of this hazard from the hazards research and analysis 
community - agencies like FEMA.  In fact, FEMA’s “Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk 
Assessment” report, which is over 350 pages long and discusses all of the hazards listed in table 
2.1, covers nuclear accidents in a mere two pages [11].  How an NPP accident will affect the 
land and people has been mostly left up to the nuclear power and risk analysis community.  This 
one-sided approach is similar to having only the Atmospheric Sciences community involved in 
hazard and risk analysis of cyclones.  The technical knowledge and insight about the hazard 
mechanisms can be used to define the hazard, but a full analysis needs to involve the social 
systems affected by the hazard in order to fully appreciate the risk to the people involved. 
 The term vulnerability has had a wide variety of definitions.  Cutter (1996) compiled 
many of these definitions from 1980 to 1995, and more have been generated since then [12].  
However, because this concept of vulnerability will be used in the context of probabilistic risk 
analysis, the concept presented by Dwyer [13] is adopted for the poignant relationship that is 
used.  For the purposes of this research, vulnerability is defined as,  
 “The extent to which persons or things are likely to be affected” [14].   
This is clearly a very general definition, but has the right vocabulary to be meaningful in the 
context of a nuclear accident.  The key part of this definition of vulnerability is that it implies a 
measure of “progression of failure”. 
 Two types of vulnerabilities are typically studied: social vulnerability, and physical 
vulnerability.  Physical vulnerability can be represented by a variety of terms.  When the hazard 
is due to man-made technology, some studies call this physical vulnerability [10], some call it 
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geo-physical vulnerability [15], and some call it technical vulnerability [16].  Using the term 
“vulnerability” for this concept ends up being confusing.  Essentially, this physical vulnerability 
is just the hazard posed to the population.   
 Social vulnerability, then, is an indicator of how susceptible a group of people will be to a 
specific hazard.  Typically, social vulnerability is quantified as a social vulnerability index, 
which can be relative to local, state, or national demographics [17].  The social vulnerability 
index is calculated from selected characteristics of the people in an area and relates to how much 
a hazard will affect those people.  Therefore social vulnerability, and the calculated index 
associated, is both hazard-dependent, as well as dependent on demographic information on the 
population.  A person’s ability to get to higher ground in a flooding situation may be very 
different for that same person’s ability to evacuate the entire area because of a nuclear accident.     
2.3 VULNERABILITY CAUSAL MODELS 
 Conceptual causal models from the hazards community regarding vulnerability are 
presented in the next section.  These models represent decades of development and 
improvement.  Some of the more frequently used theories to explain the interactions between 
“vulnerability,” “hazard,” and “risk” are explained to give the reader more context of the 
community conducting vulnerability research [22]. 
2.3.1 PRESSURE AND RELEASE MODEL 
 Equation 2.8 is a shared relationship in the Pressure and Release (PAR) model [24].  It 
conceptualizes a “pressure” building from two opposing forces: the generation of vulnerability 
and the development of the hazard.  The intersection of these two forces results in disaster.  The 
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“release” from this disaster comes in the form of community resources and mitigation systems to 
reduce the pressure (and the ultimate risk) by making the population more resilient [24]. 
 
Figure 2.3. Pressure and Release (PAR) model: the progression of vulnerability [24]. 
The authors of the PAR model stress that the hazard on the right side of Figure 2.3 and the 
progression of vulnerability on the left side are not distinct and independent.  Indeed, the claim is 
that, “hazard events themselves also change the set of resources available to households … and 
alter the patterns of recoverability of different groups of people [24].”  In fact, as a hazard 
progresses, so does people’s vulnerability. 
 The PAR model is a good visualization to explain how naturally occurring phenomena 
can turn into disaster [22].  This model reinforces the fact that risk only exists when a hazard and 
a population with vulnerabilities are present at the same time.  
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2.3.2 HAZARDS-OF-PLACE MODEL 
 One of the earliest hazard/vulnerability models that presented a causal process is the 
hazards-of-place (HOP) model.  The HOP model conceptualizes two types of vulnerability: 
biophysical and social.  The combination of the two is what Cutter calls “place vulnerability” 
[12].  The process to determine these vulnerabilities is given in Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2.4. The Hazards-of-Place model of vulnerability [7]. 
 This shows mitigation measures explicitly modeled, although still as a lump factor rather 
than as individual mitigative strategies, which is more explicit than the PAR model.  The other 
aspect that might be considered an improvement over the PAR model is that the HOP model’s 
process to reach its target node of “place vulnerability” has feedback to “risk” and “mitigation.”  
Therefore, place vulnerability can change over time, as efforts to mitigate the hazard may change 
the risk (for better or worse) [22]. 
 The biophysical vulnerability in this model is very similar to the “geo-physical” or 
“technical” vulnerability in other vulnerability studies.  In Equation 2.8, this would be the same 
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as the definition of hazard, so the term “place vulnerability” is a much closer concept to this risk 
than a completely separate type of vulnerability.  Further, this model emphasizes both types of 
vulnerabilities equally, something that requires more research to determine weighting factors 
during quantification [22]. 
2.3.3 DISASTER RESILIENCE OF PLACE MODEL 
 Cutter [12] further developed the HOP model into the disaster resilience of place (DROP) 
model [23].  The process of the DROP model moves from left to right as seen in Figure 2.5.   
 
Figure 2.5. Schematic representation of the disaster resilience of place (DROP) model [23]. 
 The DROP model attempts to qualify the ability of a community to adapt and remain 
resilient.  Thus, the feedback in this model is more robust than in the HOP model.  It also 
incorporates the term “preparedness,” a pre-event concept as opposed to mitigation, which is part 
of the post-event phase [23].  The DROP model shifts the focus of hazard and vulnerability 
modeling away from vulnerability to the more dynamic idea of community resiliency. 
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2.3.4 URBAN VULNERABILITY FRAMEWORK 
 Dewan [22] developed a vulnerability framework to be applied to an urban environment.  
This framework was used in flood research, but the key concepts apply to all hazards.  This 
model claims to be based primarily on the HOP model, with elements from many other areas of 
research.  Figure 2.6 shows that this model is much simpler than the DROP model, and even the 
HOP model, but adds an element called “coping capacity.”  Dewan claims that the coping 
capacity is adaptive and is the “capability of a community to withstand or recover from disasters 
[22].” 
 
Figure 2.6. Conceptual framework for urban vulnerability [22]. 
2.4 USING VULNERABILITY TO DEFINE LOCATION-SPECIFIC SOCIO-TECHNICAL 
RISK FOR NUCLEAR POWER SEVERE ACCIDENT 
 For the remainder of this thesis, when “vulnerability” is used, it refers to social 
vulnerability.  When “hazard” is used, it refers to the natural or man-made condition that poses a 
level of threat to public health and the environment. In this research, “hazard” is location specific 
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since it is associated with the radiation dosage that is a function of distance from radiation 
source. 
Vulnerability has been used in the context of NPP research before, in the context of 
describing the plant’s vulnerability to hostile actions and attacks (i.e., terrorism, physical attack, 
cyber-attack) [16, 17].  In the context of plant vulnerability, stakeholders and decision makers 
consider the protection of an asset. This research will use a different definition for vulnerability, 
one that focuses on social vulnerability, or the socio-economic, demographic and political factors 
associated with the stakeholders in the vicinity of a NPP. In this thesis, social vulnerability refers 
to the local population. 
 Hazard and vulnerability are related by equation 2.8; when quantifying risk of a specific 
hazard, given a specific location and a population with social vulnerabilities.  
Risk = Hazard × Vulnerability    (2.8) 
Several studies (See [22], [13], and [23]) use a similar relationship for hazard and vulnerability.  
Some hazard analysis studies describe the hazard and vulnerability relationship with an 
additional term, which considers the ‘elements exposed’ [13]. Dwyer [13] claims that ’elements 
exposed’ refers to multiple factors, such as the “people, buildings and networks, that are subject 
to the impact of a specific hazard” [13].  For the approach provided in this thesis, ‘elements 
exposed’ is not necessary to assess risk, as long as the vulnerability is referring to the local 
population.  For example, using social vulnerability in the above equation applies ‘risk’ to the 
local population, given a specific hazard. In the case of environmental or economic 
vulnerabilities, the concept of ‘elements exposed’ would be included, and the risk posed to each 
of these elements by a hazard could be calculated.   
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 Other than ‘elements exposed,’ Wisner [23] considers the term ‘resources’. Resources are 
those elements that help to mitigate and diminish the impact of a hazard to the community [23].  
Another way to describe resources, is ‘coping capability’ [23].  In several studies, ‘resources’ 
and ‘comping capability’ are used interchangeably, as shown in equation 2.9: 
Risk = Hazard x (Vulnerability – Resources)   OR   Risk = Hazard x (Vulnerability – Coping) (2.9) 
Mitigating systems may be part of the hazard or the vulnerability, depending on the system’s 
goal for mitigating the severity of the hazard (safety systems), or the effects of the hazard 
(emergency plans).   
 It is the intent of this research to consider, within the vulnerability analysis, the resources 
or coping capabilities that diminish the total risk. Therefore, it is actually a part of the 
vulnerability of a population that is calculated.  Resources and coping capability reduce the total 
vulnerability calculated, and the quantity within the parentheses in equation 2.9 is considered as 
one. 
 Equation 2.8 closely resembles the equation for risk given in chapter 1 for risk in the 
PRA community, namely: 
Risk = Frequency × Consequence    (2.10) 
If a parallel between PRA and hazards analysis can be made, the bridge between these two 
communities lies within this equation.  In Level 1 PRA, we basically do not have the term 
“consequence” in the estimation of risk. The risk is “frequency” of core damage (CDF). This 
frequency is calculated by frequency of initiating event times the Conditional Probability of 
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Failure Progression Scenarios.  Therefore, the term risk in Level 1 PRA can be defined using 
equation (2.11) as following:  
Risk = Frequency of initiating event× Conditional Probability of Failure Progression Scenarios   
 (2.11) 
This thesis uses the same approach for Level 3 PRA.  “Frequency of initiating event at 
each location near the plant ” is the  “radiation dosage frequency” at each location. Radiation 
dosage is the “hazard” term in equation (2.8). The outcome of Level 3 PRA gives us the 
radiation dosage frequency. We will run Level 3 PRA software without running the evacuation 
module and so the outcome will be dosage frequency as an initiating event frequency for our 
Level 3 risk modeling methodology.  The frequency is coming from LERF and the magnitude of 
dose is calculated from the modules (except evacuation module) inside the Level 3 PRA code.  
For the “Conditional Probability of Failure Progression Scenarios”, we will use 
“vulnerability” as an indicator of failure progression.   The magnitude of dose accumulated by 
the population relates to a degree of “failure/damage progression” (i.e., vulnerability) in the 
population that is associated with evacuation deficiencies. In other words, the “vulnerability” 
term in this calculation is also a surrogate factor for a social-informed evacuation deficiency. 
Since both radiation hazard frequency and vulnerability are location-specific, we will calculate a 
location-specific socio-technical risk.  
The merging of these two methods, to be applied in Chapters 4 and 5, creates 
advancement in an explicit integration of social factors with Level 3 PRA. In order to account for 
differences within the population surrounding a nuclear power plant, social factors can be used, 
but quantifying a complex social system to better model evacuation behavior is too complicated 
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and there is no theory to support such an exercise.  Therefore, by using social vulnerability as a 
surrogate factor for evacuation behavior, we can more explicitly consider the effects of social 
differences on evacuation behavior.  One of the key insights from bridging hazard/vulnerability 
research with Level 3 PRA is that results can be location specific.  This, in turn, can help 
decision makers and planners with risk-information to better prepare the population at risk for an 
NPP accident.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 This chapter identifies, compares, and gives a summary of the major tools and methods 
used in Level 3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) (Section 3.1), social vulnerability 
quantification (Section 3.2), and a brief overview of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
(Section 3.3) .   
 Not all computer codes that calculate off-site consequences due to a nuclear power plant 
accident are probabilistic; therefore, they are not used in Level 3 PRA.  However, probabilistic 
and non-probabilistic software perform calculations in a comparable sequence, and are both 
considered accident consequence codes [3].  Greater detail has been given to MACCS2 in this 
chapter because it is the US NRC’s main consequence code and it (or its predecessor) has been 
utilized in all major Level 3 PRA conducted by the NRC.  MACCS2 is also one of the more 
sophisticated accident consequence codes currently in use. 
 The depth and breadth of details on MACCS2 and other accident consequence codes in 
this chapter are necessary, as all aspects of the codes need to be analyzed before the code is 
integrated with another software.  These details show that, despite many deterministic equations 
that lead to the final risk calculation in Level 3 PRA, social information from the surrounding 
population demographics is missing within this software.  How accident consequence codes 
calculate risk to the public is important, and each sequence of the calculation must be analyzed to 
determine if there are any attributes that could make the calculation more accurate. 
 An introduction to these codes gives a useful perspective to the various technical 
capabilities of the major available software, and identifies the shared area that is lacking social 
information.  Section 3.1.3 compares the existing codes and demonstrates the common features 
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in Table 3.1. The comparison highlights that evacuation modeling is a feature available in most 
of the accident consequence codes.  However, what information is available to make the 
evacuation accurate?  Having more flexibility with the evacuation model is one aspect to 
consider, but understanding how the population will actually react is something completely 
separate.  Introducing social vulnerability to this modeling is one way to explicitly integrate the 
social qualities of the local population and create a more realistic evacuation scenario.  The 
process to introduce social vulnerability is through a social vulnerability index. 
Section 3.2 of this chapter describes the ways to implement the concept of social 
vulnerability, theoretically introduced in Chapter 2, in a practical manner.  This further benefits 
the nuclear community by helping them understand the complexity in the calculation of a social 
vulnerability index.  Based on the method or social theory, some social factors can be either 
stressed or downplayed; the decision is left to the analyst.  The factors that are important should 
be hazard specific; those that affect a population’s ability to withstand the effects of flooding are 
not necessarily the same as those required to cope with a nuclear accident [25]. 
 Social vulnerability is quantified by the development of a social vulnerability index 
(SVI).  It is impractical to compare each social factor for a geographic area individually as, 
sometimes, there are more than 30 factors that could be considered. This would result in a 
massively time-consuming project.  Developing a SVI gives a method to consider all applicable 
social factors to geographically compare different subpopulations of the larger local population.   
 Part of this chapter on “methodology” includes how to consider both social vulnerability 
and the hazard of a nuclear accident in the same context.  Dose, measured in Sieverts (Sv), and 
the dimensionless social vulnerability index, need a common domain in order to be combined.  
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This process is accomplished within the geographic information system (GIS) software, which is 
explained in Section 3.3.  The use of GIS allows for combining radiation hazard and 
vulnerability in a spatial setting. 
Even though nuclear power plant accidents have been mapped and used for analysis in 
GIS software, and social vulnerability has been primarily considered in the GIS environment, 
these two have never been considered in a single study.  The combination of social vulnerability 
with an NPP accident has never been analyzed, and it is through this analysis that emergency 
preparedness decisions can be made in a risk-informed manner.    Evacuation modeling within 
Level 3 probabilistic consequence codes can be improved, as well. This will be explained in 
Chapter 5. 
3.1 OFF-SITE ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCE SOFTWARE 
 Computer modeling codes of radiological release, transport, and dose conversion can be 
generally categorized in two different ways depending on purpose: emergency response vs. 
emergency planning.  The areas where these two types of consequence codes differ are in their 
ease of use, speed of calculation, and required input information [3].  Purely emergency response 
consequence codes are used after an accident occurs to aid in decision making.  Emergency 
planning consequence codes do not run on real-time data, and are useful for probabilistic 
analysis.  Examples include the United States’ MACCS2 and the European Commission’s 
COSYMA [12].  Conducting probabilistic risk assessments using emergency response 
consequence codes is not possible.  Examples of this type of code are RASCAL [15] from the 
US and RODOS [21] from the EC.   
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 The following reactor accident consequence codes are described as representative 
samples that include current capabilities.  The last comparison of performance for some of these 
international accident consequence codes was conducted in the late 1990s [1, 2], and many 
advancements have been made to these codes since then.  MACCS2, the first listed below, is 
described in great detail, due to its importance in the United States.  All other codes are 
summarized and how they differ from the MACCS2 code is examined.  A summary of the 
comparisons of the consequence codes is presented in Table 3.1. 
3.1.1 MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) 
 The original probabilistic accident consequence code used in the United States in 1975 
for the Reactor Safety Study was the Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences (CRAC) 
[4].  CRAC2, revised in 1982, was the updated version of this consequence code.  In 1987, the 
MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) was developed to replace the CRAC2 
code [5].  The primary objective for CRAC was to perform the Reactor Safety Study, and so it 
and its successor, CRAC2, had many parameter values that were fixed because they were 
specific to this particular study [6].  With the intention of also having the flexibility to perform 
sensitivity and uncertainty studies, and the ability to vary many of the input parameters,  
MACCS was used for analysis in NUREG-1150, published in 1990.  This allowed MACCS to be 
used in a variety of studies for different commercial NPPs, Department of Energy facilities, and 
Department of Defense nuclear facilities [6].   
 One of the primary reasons that MACCS2 (MACCS version 2) was developed was 
because there were only limited sets of radionuclides that were selectable for the source term in 
MACCS.  This broadened the applicability of this consequence code for commercial and non-
commercial nuclear facilities [6].  It was used in the most recent full-scope PRA study conducted 
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by the NRC (State-of-the Art Reactor Consequence Analysis (SOARCA)) [7], as well as for non-
reactor-based studies such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) environmental 
impact statements [6]. 
 MACCS2 was developed and is distributed by Sandia National Laboratory.  MACCS2 is 
the most sophisticated Level 3 PRA code in the United States.  It was used in the last Level 3 
PRA study by the NRC [7], and will be used in the next full-scope site Level 3 PRA project [8].  
The inputs, processes, and output for this consequence software are shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1. Structure of the MACCS2 code [9]. 
All calculations performed in MACCS2 are stored based on a polar-coordinate spatial grid (r, θ).  
As Figure 3.1 shows, MACCS2 has three main modules: ATMOS, EARLY, and CHRONC.  
Details on each module are described here. 
 “ATMOS performs all of the calculations pertaining to atmospheric transport, dispersion, 
and deposition, as well as for the radioactive decay that occurs prior to release and while the 
material is in the atmosphere” [6].  MACCS2 has the capability to consider 150 radionuclides.  
However, this number is limited by the number of dose conversion factors and is practically 
restricted to 60 radionuclides.   
71 
 
 The source term provided to MACCS2 is generated in Methods for Estimation of 
Leakages and Consequences of Releases (MELCOR), and an interface tool named MELMACCS 
can be used to create an input file that is formatted for MACCS2 from the output source term file 
from MELCOR [10].  Nuclide concentrations can also be entered manually, which is one of the 
reasons that MACCS2 is more versatile. 
 Weather data are site specific and consist of a collection of hourly meteorological data 
collected over the course of one year.  The 8,760 data points consist of wind direction, wind 
speed, atmospheric stability, and accumulated precipitation.  MACCS2 is capable of the 
following weather sampling: 
 Fixed start time in the weather file (day, hour) 
 Weather bin sampling 
 120 hours of weather supplied by the user 
 Constant weather conditions 
 Stratified random sampling from equally-spaced intervals 
 The best weather sampling, from a probabilistic perspective, is weather bin sampling or 
stratified random sampling.  Sampling weather data allows for the incorporation of propagating 
aleatory uncertainty about weather patterns in the local area.  The weather bin sampling method, 
which has been utilized as far back as the CRAC2 era, sorts weather into categories based on 
wind stability and precipitation and assigns probabilities to each category.  The stratified random 
sampling method divides a 24-hour day into one, two, three, or four equal periods of time and 
randomly samples from each of these time periods [6].   
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 ATMOS data, such as decay chain data and transport and dispersion constants, is also 
stored within this module in order to perform the calculations.  The ATMOS module takes 
weather and radionuclide data and calculates plume rise, dispersion, and deposition.  Plume rise 
is calculated using the Briggs method described in Appendix A.  Equation 3.1 below uses the 
same format as equation A.1 in Appendix A. 
∆ℎ =  
1.6𝐹
1
3⁄ 𝑥
2
3⁄
𝑢
      (3.1) 
Provided wind speed is not too high, past a critical wind speed uc that is dependent on release 
height and the buoyance flux (F in equation 3.1) which is also calculated in MACCS2, plume 
rise will occur [11].   
 Radiological transport and dispersion is governed by the Gaussian Plume equation given 
in equation A.3 from Appendix A, and repeated below.   
𝑐(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) =  
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]  (3.2) 
Equation 3.2 gives the concentration distributions of radioactive material based on location from 
the source.  While the Gaussian plume equation is not as accurate, especially at longer distances, 
as other transport models, it is simple and computationally efficient [11].  Downwind transport is 
governed simply by [11]: 
𝑑 =  ∑ 𝑣𝑖 ∗ ∆𝑡𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1       (3.3) 
where: 
 
73 
 
d = Downwind distance (m) 
Δt = Arrival time of the reference point (s) 
vi = Wind speed during the period of time Δti (m/s) 
n = Number of time periods 
 Analytical equations for the standard deviations in equation 3.2 have been generated 
based on wind stability categories.  The equations follow the form [11]: 
𝜎𝑦𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖𝑥
𝑏𝑖                 𝑎𝑛𝑑           𝜎𝑧𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖𝑥
𝑑𝑖    (3.4) 
where i denotes the prevailing stability class (A-F) based on Pasquill-Gifford’s classes.  The 
Pasquill-Gifford stability classes are categorizations of weather settings that determine a plume’s 
ability to expand and, therefore, the speed at which the plume disperses through the air.  The 
constants ai, bi, ci, and di are listed in Table 2.2 of [11], and the relationships of equation 3.4 can 
be seen in figure 3.2 below. 
 
Figure 3.2.  Dependence of σy and σz on distance for the six Pasquill-Gifford stability classes A 
through F [11]. 
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 MACCS2 further modified the development of σy and σz to include a lookup-table as an 
alternative to the power-law functions given in Equation 3.4.  This gives the user greater 
flexibility than the simplified power-law function [6] gives to define plume expansion. 
 Both wet and dry depositions, as well as radioactive decay, are modeled within 
MACCS2.  Originally, MACCS restricted decay chains to just two-member decay chains, 
allowing the user to only use simple parent-daughter chains [11].  The decay chain model in 
MACCS2 allows for 825 radionuclides to be considered with up to six generations of decay [6].  
This allows for all radioactive isotopes contained in the source term to be fully analyzed. 
 The rate of loss of plume materials by dry deposition to the ground at the downwind 
distance x is given by [11]: 
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑥
= −∫ 𝜔(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑑𝑦
∞
−∞
    (3.5) 
where  
ω(x, y) = Plume material flux to the ground (Bq/m2), impacted by dry deposition velocity that 
incorporates effects of gravitational settlings on the ground [11] 
 Wet deposition due to contamination washout from precipitation is calculated using 
equation 3.6 below [11]: 
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑡
= −Λ𝑄 = −𝑎𝐼𝑏𝑄     (3.6) 
where: 
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Λ = Washout coefficient (1/s) 
I  = Precipitation intensity (mm/hr) 
a  = 9.5×10
-5
  ;b  = 0.8 
 The end result of the ATMOS module calculates the arrival time of the leading edge of 
the plume, the duration of time overhead, the ratio of the air concentration at ground level to the 
average air concentration, and the angular width of the plume per spatial element around the 
plant [11].  When there are multiple source terms and multiple plumes, the quantities are 
calculated for each. 
 The EARLY module calculates all parameters pertaining to the emergency phase.  This 
phase can be modeled to last between one and seven days after the first plume of the release 
arrives in each downwind area.  Cloudshine, groundshine, and resuspension inhalation are the 
exposure pathways considered in this module of MACCS2 [6].   
 Cloudshine is modeled using the semi-infinite cloud approximation illustrated in 
Appendix A.  Cloudshine dose is calculated for each spatial element using [11]: 
𝐷𝐶𝑘 = (∑ 𝐴𝐶𝑖
𝑐 ∙ 𝐷𝐹𝐶∞𝑖𝑘𝑖 ) ∙ 𝐶 ∙ 𝐹 ∙ 𝑆𝐹𝐶   (3.7) 
where 
DCi       = Cloudshine dose to organ k (Sv) 
AC
c
i      = Time-integrated air concentration (Bq ·s/m
3
) of radionuclide i 
DFC∞ik = Semi-infinite close dose conversion factor to organ k for radionuclide i (Sv·m
3
/Bq·s) 
C          = Off-centerline (plume) correction factor 
F          = Fraction of exposure duration 
SFC     = Cloudshine shielding factor 
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DFC∞ik is provided in MACCS2 via a dose conversion factor file.  
 Groundshine dose is calculated by integrating dose rate over the period of exposure.  The 
groundshine dose rate varies depending on whether the plume is passing through the spatial 
element or if it has already passed.  Plume passage is modeled as a linear ramp function as it 
approaches, and as an exponential decay function after it passes [11].  The difference in the 
groundshine dose accumulated during and after plume passage is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
  
Figure 3.3. Illustration of groundshine dose rate function and different event times [11]. 
 Internal dose from inhalation is used for estimating early health effects and latent cancer 
fatalities.  This dose is calculated using the following equation for each spatial element located 
around the site accident [11]: 
𝐷𝐼𝑘 = (∑ 𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑘) ∙ 𝐵𝑅 ∙ 𝐽 ∙ 𝐹 ∙ 𝑆𝐹𝐼    (3.8) 
where 
DIk     = Cloud inhalation dose to organ k (Sv) 
ACi    = Time-integrated ground level air concentration (Bq ·s/m
3
) 
DFIik = Inhalation dose conversion factor to organ k for radionuclide i (Sv/Bq) 
BR     = Breathing rate (m
3
/s) 
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J         = Off-centerline correction factor 
F        = Fraction of exposure duration 
SFI     = Inhalation shielding factor 
Note that Equation 3.7 and Equation 3.8 are extremely similar in calculating dose due to 
cloudshine or inhalation.  Resuspension inhalation follows the exact same calculation as 
Equation 3.8, except that it is based on ground concentration (GCi) rather than air concentration 
(ACi), and a resuspension factor (RF) rather than exposure duration (F) [11]. 
 The CHRONC module in MACCS2 calculates the intermediate and long-term phases of 
the emergency.  Upon the conclusion of the emergency phase, the intermediate phase can be set 
to last between zero and one year.  The exposure pathways considered in the intermediate phase 
are groundshine and resuspension inhalation, because MACCS assumes that the plume has 
passed and all that remains is ground-deposited material.  The long-term phase begins at the 
conclusion of the intermediate phase, and considers groundshine, resuspension inhalation, and 
food and water ingestion [6]. 
 Because this research is concerned with applying social information to assist in making 
decisions for emergency planning, preparedness, and response, a thorough description of the 
CHRONC module has been omitted because it is beyond the scope of the immediate response 
phase.  There is no room for integrating any social information beyond those aspects that we 
have already discussed.  Plume development, transport and deposition, and exposure pathway 
calculations are modeled using deterministic equations.  The last portion of the MACCS 
calculations has to do with mitigative actions. 
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 The three mitigative actions that are applicable to the emergency phase in the EARLY 
module of MACCS are evacuation, sheltering, and temporary relocation.  Sheltering is defined 
within MACCS as, “the deliberate action by the public to take advantage of the protection 
against radiation exposure afforded by remaining indoors and away from doors and windows 
during and after the passage of the radioactive plume” [11].  Population relocation is defined to 
be, “temporary relocation of non-evacuating people following deposition” [11].  Sheltering is 
modeled in MACCS by applying a shielding factor to the cloudshine dose, while relocation is 
modeled by removing people who would be affected by a local hotspot of 0.5 Sv [6]. 
 Evacuation modeling in MACCS2 has evolved significantly since the development of the 
original CRAC code used for the Reactor Safety Study. MACCS only allowed a straight-line 
evacuation path away from the release point at a constant speed.  MACCS2 now allows for 
networked evacuation paths, variable evacuation speeds, and multiple evacuation populations 
[6]. 
 
(a) Radial Evacuation     (b)  Network Evacuation 
Figure 3.4.  Examples of a radial evacuation scheme and network evacuation based on normal 
traffic flow [6]. 
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 MACCS2 allows for full control over modeling how the local population will react at the 
time of evacuation.  All parameters are modifiable within this software to represent the entire 
population.  Differences between radial and network evacuation are shown in Figure 3.4 above. 
 Mitigative actions can have a significant effect on accident consequences [11].  The 
accuracy of the mitigative action models in MACCS2 is determined by the inputs defined by the 
user.  The parameters that are input to define the evacuation in MACCS2 are described in further 
detail in Chapter 5. 
 In 2001, an effort was made to create a Windows-based interface for the MACCS2 code.  
This was motivated by a need to simplify the creation or modification of input files, reduce user 
errors, and easily account for uncertainties in input data.  This effort resulted in a program named 
WinMACCS [10].  Sandia National Laboratory, the originator of MACCS and MACCS2, also 
published WinMACCS.  The processes of WinMACCS are shown in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5. WinMACCS components [10]. 
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 WinMACCS allows for a central program to run uncertainty analysis (LHS), perform 
food-chain modeling (COMIDA2), generate population input files (PopMod), run MACCS2, and 
produce selectable results and output files.  The operation of WinMACCS is covered in more 
detail in Chapters 4 and 5. 
3.1.2 OTHER ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCE CODES 
 Other accident consequence codes have been developed in other countries for many of 
the same purposes as MACCS2.  Some are directed more toward emergency planning and some 
were designed specifically for decision makers during emergency response.  A short description 
of several of these codes, along with a table at the end of this section summarizing the features 
and capabilities of the more prominent codes for calculating nuclear accident consequences, are 
provided below. 
COSYMA 
 The European Commission (EC) in 1982, shortly after the Reactor Safety Study in the 
US, also started to consider the total risk to the public from a nuclear accident. The Methods for 
Assessing the Radiological Impact of Accidents (MARIA) program was initiated, with one 
objective which was to develop an accurate Level 3 PRA code for the European Union [12]. 
 Previous consequence codes from Germany (UFOMOD) and the United Kingdom 
(MARC) assisted in providing a basis for this proposed code.  The Code System from MARIA 
(COSYMA) was developed as a joint effort in support of consequence analysis in the EC.  PC 
COSYMA is similar to WinMACCS in that it contains the core COSYMA executable program, 
as well as other models, databases, and parameters associated with the MARIA program [12]. 
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 Unlike MACCS, COSYMA does not make use of a straight-line Gaussian plume model, 
but uses a segmented plume model for dispersion.  This allows for a more accurate plume 
development than a straight-line Gaussian model because it allows current weather data 
updating.  The trajectory of the plume might resemble something less like Figure A.3 in 
Appendix A, and something more like the Figure 3.6 below. 
 
Figure 3.6. Segmented Gaussian Plume development [13]. 
COSYMA and MACCS have been benchmarked together in several international studies [1, 2, 
14]. 
RASCAL 
 The Radiological Assessment System for Consequence Analysis (RASCAL) code is an 
emergency response consequence code developed in the US that is designed to contain software 
modules to make quick calculations concerning all aspects of an NPP accident.  These modules 
include: 
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 Source Term to Dose 
 Field Measurement to Dose 
 Radionuclide Data Viewer 
 Decay Calculator 
 Create Inventory Base File/ Source Term Merge 
 Meteorological Download 
When generating a source term, all operating US NPPs are pre-loaded into RASCAL, and 
specific information about operating history, refueling cycle, type of accident, and amount of 
damage are entered by the user.  Up-to-date meteorological data can be used to calculate plume 
dispersion in the event of an accident [15]. 
 RASCAL has the option to use either a straight-line Gaussian plume model, or a 
Gaussian puff model.  Puff models are more accurate in low wind conditions [13], and RASCAL 
does not implement the puff model until the plume is further away from the site [15].  One 
feature that RASCAL has, that other accident consequence codes do not, is the ability to display 
calculations visually, as seen in Figure 3.7.  RASCAL can also export the results as a shapefile to 
be used in ArcGIS software. 
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Figure 3.7.  Example output screen of RASCAL [15]. 
3.1.3 SUMMARY 
 There are several options when it comes to selecting an appropriate accident consequence 
assessment software.  However, not all of these are capable of being implemented in a full Level 
3 PRA study.  Only those that are capable of being scenario-based can be probabilistic and, 
therefore, used in PRA.  A summary of some of the major accident consequence codes is given 
below in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1. Comparison of several accident consequence codes [6], [12], [15],  [16], [17], [18], 
[19], [20], [21]. 
Code Function Country Source term 
development 
Dispersion 
Model 
Countermeasures Uncertainty 
MACCS2 Planning US No Straight-
line 
Gaussian 
Plume 
Evacuation, 
sheltering, extended 
relocation, KI 
prophylactic 
Yes 
COSYMA Planning EU Yes Segmented 
Gaussian 
Plume 
Evacuation, 
sheltering, relocation, 
KI prophylactic 
Yes 
PACE Planning UK No Straight-
line 
Gaussian 
Plume;  
Lagrangian 
particle 
Evacuation, 
sheltering, KI 
prophylactic 
Yes 
OSCAAR Planning Japan No Multi-puff Evacuation, 
sheltering, relocation 
Yes 
LENA Planning Sweden No Straight-
line 
Gaussian 
Plume 
Evacuation, 
sheltering, relocation 
Yes 
RASCAL Response US Yes Straight-
line 
Gaussian 
Plume 
None No 
RODOS Response EU Yes Lagrangian 
puff; 
Lagrangian 
particle 
Evacuation, 
sheltering, relocation, 
KI prophylactic 
No 
 
 Note that evacuation modeling is a feature available in most of the accident consequence 
codes.  However, what information is available to make the evacuation accurate?  Having more 
flexibility with the evacuation model is one aspect to consider, but understanding how the 
population will actually react is something completely separate.  Introducing social vulnerability 
to this modeling is one way to integrate the social qualities of the local population and create a 
more realistic evacuation scenario.  The process to introduce social vulnerability is through a 
social vulnerability index. 
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3.2 SOCIAL VULNERABILITY INDEX CALCULATION METHODS 
 The models of the social vulnerability theory discussed in chapter 2 attempt to explain 
how different social factors can contribute to an individual’s vulnerability in a state of 
emergency.  However, these theories do not necessarily explain how to use this information in a 
quantified and practical way.  The most common way social vulnerability has been quantified is 
by use of a social vulnerability index. 
 A social vulnerability index takes the social factors identified in the vulnerability model 
of choice and calculates a single number to represent a specific population’s vulnerability.  This 
implies that higher the vulnerability index is,  the more vulnerable the population is, and the 
greater the consequences will be for this population due to a hazard, whether it is natural or man-
made.  The process of generating one value to represent many factors can differ, and these 
different processes are covered in this section. 
 Combining many different social factors into one surrogate number has its disadvantages.  
Double-counting factors that are dependent on one another is one concern.  In fact, one might 
argue that all social parameters share interdependence because of the relationships they play in 
society [22].  The reward for generating a vulnerability index is the ability to quantify a 
population’s potential consequences due to a hazard, which gives decision makers something 
tangible to use in their decision making process. 
 Figure 3.8 graphically shows the process for conducting a vulnerability analysis and 
quantifying social vulnerability in the form of an index [23].  The area of concern must be 
assigned in order to normalize it later in the analysis.  A qualitative assessment must also be 
conducted in order to identify social variables that drive the social vulnerability in that area [24].   
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Figure 3.8. Social vulnerability development process [23]. 
 The factors considered important, and how they should be considered in the calculation 
of a social vulnerability index, are not the same for all vulnerability studies.  However, there is a 
general consensus among the social science community regarding the major factors and their 
tendency to increase or decrease social vulnerability [25].  Many of these social indicators are 
listed in Table 3.2.  This table is not all encompassing, but does represent a majority of the 
commonly agreed-upon factors. 
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Table 3.2. Social vulnerability concepts and metrics [25]. 
Social 
Indicator/Factor 
Description Increase or Decrease Social 
Vulnerability 
Socioeconomic Status May include income, political power, or 
prestige. However, high status has more 
to lose 
High status (+/-) 
Low status (-) 
Gender Statistically, women earn lower wages, 
and typically are responsible for family 
care 
Women (+) 
Race and Ethnicity Language and cultural barriers Non-white (+) 
Age Typical cutoffs are < 18 years old and > 
65 years old 
Elderly (+) 
Children (+) 
Commercial 
Development 
Indicative of economic health and 
potential loss 
High density (+) 
High value (+/-) 
Employment Loss Contributes to a slower recovery Employment loss (+) 
Rural/Urban Both rural and urban communities can 
be more vulnerable due to income or 
high-density 
Rural (+) 
Urban (+) 
Residential Property Home value Mobile homes (+) 
Infrastructure and 
Lifelines 
Can lead to financial burden or over-
dependence on infrastructure that is 
damaged during a hazard 
Extensive infrastructure (+) 
Renters Indicates transient population or lower 
income 
Renters (+) 
Occupation Also includes immigration status Professional (-) 
Clerical, Labor, or Service (+) 
Family Structure Limited finances or extensive 
responsibilities 
Large families (+) 
Single-parent (+) 
Education Linked to socioeconomic status Little education (+) 
Highly educated (-) 
Population Growth Rapid growth may create lack of 
infrastructure 
Rapid growth (+) 
Medical Services Contributes to available resources More medical facilities (-) 
Social Dependence People who require social services for 
survival 
High dependence (+) 
Low dependence (-) 
Special Needs Examples include hospitals, nursing 
homes, and homeless shelters 
Special needs (+) 
 
 The indicators listed in Table 3.2 can be thought of as general categories.  Census data 
should be used to represent these categories.  For example, there are no direct census data for 
“social dependence”, but this can be accounted for by determining the per capita Social Security 
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recipients.  Further, each of these factors may matter more or less depending on the hazard 
analysis that coincides with the vulnerability analysis.  For instance, the importance of having 
medical services available may be less important when a hazard requires an evacuation with very 
few short-term injuries expected, such as the evacuation around a NPP.  Ultimately, these factors 
are good indicators of social vulnerability, independent of the hazard [25]. 
 Three major approaches for constructing a social vulnerability index distinguish 
themselves through structural design.  These approaches are categorized as deductive, 
hierarchical, and inductive.  Deductive models incorporate the fewest number of factors and 
were most commonly used with early vulnerability studies.  Hierarchical models use more 
indicators that are separated into groups that share common dimensions of vulnerability.  
Inductive models begin with a large set of factors which are then reduced to a small number of 
factors through principal components analysis [26].  Principal components analysis “reduces a 
complex set of many correlated variables into a set of a few, uncorrelated components [27].  An 
illustration of these three structural distinctions is shown in Figure 3.9. 
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Figure 3.9. Structural models for social vulnerability index development: (a) Deductive; (b) 
Hierarchical; (c) Inductive [26]. 
 Tate [26] concludes, through uncertainty and sensitivity analysis, that no model structure 
shown in Figure 3.9 is inherently better than another for calculating a vulnerability index.  Based 
on this study, the following table 3.3 has been generated: 
Table 3.3.  Comparative assessment of structural model index calculation [26] 
Aspect Deductive Hierarchical Inductive 
Baseline Index 
(based on median) 
Worst performer Most accurate 
Most precise (based on 
variance) 
Indicator Set Highly sensitive Less sensitive Highly sensitive 
Analysis Scale Scale invariant Scale invariant Highly influential 
Measurement Error Applies to all models 
Data 
Transformation 
Highest influence over all models 
Normalization Lowest influence over all models 
Weighting Scheme 
Insensitive 
Main driver of 
uncertainty 
Moderately sensitive 
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 Several international indices have been developed, including the Disaster Risk Index 
(DRI) [28] and Predictive Indicator of Vulnerability (PIV) [29].  DRI was developed by the 
United Nations, and follows a hierarchical model with sub-indices for earthquake, flood, 
hurricane, and drought risk.  PIV centers on climate change vulnerability and not specific 
geophysical hazards, and follows an inductive model.  Both DRI and PIV use international data 
[30].  An example of the methods used to calculate a social vulnerability index is given in 
Chapter 4. 
 Once the considerations of the different aspects of creating a social vulnerability index 
are decided upon, a tool for compiling the social data, and the normalization and aggregation to 
actually create a social vulnerability index needs to be used.  This tool also needs to be 
convenient when conducting a hazard analysis of the radiological plume from an NPP accident.  
The common element between these two analyses is the spatial area shared by both population 
and power plant.  Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are the tools of choice for combining 
the two aspects necessary for considering risk to the public from a nuclear accident. 
3.3 GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
 Geographic Information Systems (GIS), in general, have been utilized as a tool since 
1960 [31], and used in emergency management and mitigation for over two decades [32].  GIS 
helps organize and analyze spatial and analytical data.  It also helps visualize not only raw data, 
but also processed data such as vulnerability indices. 
 GIS is an environment where vastly different data sets may be integrated into a map 
display, helping the analyst manipulate and combine, based on geographic location [32].  
Originally just used by geographers, GIS has been incorporated into many other areas of research 
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applicable to emergency management such as natural hazards analysis, identification of 
evacuation routes, and infrastructure rebuilding [33].  In all of these applications, GIS acts as a 
way to link information directly to a geographic location [31]. 
 The goal when combining hazard and vulnerability is to place them in the same 
perspective, and since each varies with location, GIS is an excellent common framework. Some 
of the elements that may be considered are illustrated in Figure 3.10. 
 
Figure 3.10. Geographic elements present in GIS software [31]. 
 The primary GIS software, called ArcGIS, was developed by Environmental Systems 
Research Institute (ESRI), which makes up over 40% of the global market share in GIS software 
[34].  Within ArcGIS are the abilities to perform database management, tools to enter and 
manipulate geographic information, and graphical displays for both user interface and 
results/reporting [31]. 
 Several accident consequence codes directly output in the ArcGIS format.  RASCAL, the 
US-based emergency response code, has the ability to produce shapefiles from calculated results 
[15].  PACE, the UK-based program developed by Public Health England, was implemented 
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directly in ArcGIS, where nuclear accident consequences are stored as spatial datasets to be 
analyzed and visualized immediately [16].   
 There have been many GIS-based vulnerability studies for a variety of hazards, including 
hazardous materials [35], floods [36], and multi-hazard [37].  Risk mapping, where hazard and 
vulnerability are simultaneously analyzed, has been extensively performed through GIS, but 
mostly directed toward natural hazards. 
 Even though nuclear power plant accidents have been mapped and used for analysis in 
GIS software, and social vulnerability has been primarily considered in the GIS environment, 
these two have never been considered in a single study.  The combination of social vulnerability 
with an NPP accident has never been analyzed, and it is through this analysis that emergency 
preparedness decisions can be made in a risk-informed manner.  Evacuation modeling within 
Level 3 probabilistic consequence codes can be improved, as well. This will be explained in 
Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 4: EXPLICIT INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL FACTORS WITH LEVEL 3 
PRA: EXTERNAL APPROACH BY LINKING MACCS2 AND ARCGIS 
 Chapter 3 of this thesis shows that the social characteristics of the population inside the 
10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) are considered implicitly.  All licensed NPPs in the 
United States are required to conduct evacuation time estimates (ETEs) [1].  ETE studies 
determine the total amount of time it takes for the population to exit the EPZ, once given an 
order to evacuate.  In order to estimate the evacuation time, specific information about the local 
population is collected during the study that can include [2]: 
 School locations and populations 
 Medical facilities 
 Transient populations 
 Transit-dependent populations 
 Telephone surveys to determine mobilization time 
This information indirectly contains social information representative of the people who live and 
work within the 10-mile EPZ. 
While social information is implicitly accounted for in the determination of evacuation 
parameters for each site through evacuation time estimate (ETE) studies, the social factors are 
neither location-specific nor explicitly incorporated. Implicit incorporation of social information 
is at one end of the spectrum (shown on the left side of the spectrum in Figure 4.1) of how to 
consider social contextual factors in prediction of evacuation behavior during a nuclear accident. 
The lack of explicit and location-specific incorporation of social, political, and community 
information provides little assurance of accurate risk quantification from a Level 3 PRA because 
of potentially inaccurate response modeling.  For example, evacuation efficiency is highly 
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location specific and social- and behavioral-dependent.  If the population performance is not 
modeled realistically during an evacuation, then the time, resources, and decisions that were 
made based on the outputs of these models may be erroneous.  In addition, without explicit 
modeling of social contributing factors, conducting a comprehensive root cause analysis and 
managing risk is not possible. The problem with incorporating the behavior and identity of the 
public implicitly is that decision makers do not know what effect or consequences the changes in 
the emergency preparedness (EP) elements will have on public health and safety.  The social 
information contained in the evacuation model is input as a lump sum and there is no process to 
be able to update when a new policy, procedure, or plan that could change the way the public 
reacts at the time of an emergency is proposed.  
A comprehensive risk management requires explicit modeling of underlying socio-
technical risk contributing factors and identifying their causal paths of influences on risk in order 
to prioritize the important risk factors and to control them by mitigating the risk sources and/or 
by blocking their paths of influence. In order to understand how decisions about EP will change 
population dynamics, societal factors must be explicitly incorporated.  This approach predicts 
public response during an emergency by considering and modeling the social factors that define 
subgroups of the population, and allows for updating that response, given changes in EP 
decisions.  This is a much more efficient method to analyze changes in EP procedures and 
practices rather than having to conduct a completely new ETE study each time to determine the 
effects of a change.  
 In this research two approaches are proposed in order to explicitly incorporate social 
factors into LEVEL 3 PRA codes: Internal (shown on the right side of spectrum in Figure 4.1) 
and external (shown on the middle part of the spectrum in Figure 4.1).   The preferred approach 
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to explicit incorporation of social factors is the internal method.  This approach is concerned 
with having access to the evacuation parameters that govern emergency response in the Level 3 
PRA software, explicitly modeling the underlying social contributing factors associated with 
those parameters and, updating those parameters with new information. This approach requires a 
causal model that traces raw demographic data to the effect seen in the evacuation parameters.  
While there have been attempts [17, 18] at creating such a causal model, most of those attempts 
are directed toward concepts of risk perception, something that, while measurable from interview 
and survey results, is not something as readily available as census data is.   
The causal model needed to update the evacuation model internal to the accident 
consequence code is something that should be built based on underlying theories.  There have 
been some causal modeling approaches to explicitly incorporate social factors into Level 1 PRA 
[19-34].  There are also some causal modeling studies to explicitly incorporate physical failure 
mechanisms into Level 1 PRA [35-43].  Very recently, research has been conducted to develop 
causal models for the incorporation of financial aspects into Level 1 PRA [44, 45].  Regarding 
Level 3 PRA, while some theories do exist in this area [17, 18], most research attempts to create 
causal relationships between social indicators and emergency response behavior through 
correlation or regression analysis [46, 47].  Also, there are no theories that map social factors 
directly to the evacuation parameters contained in specific PRA codes, only to a person’s 
decisions or actions.  These causal models must be translated into valuable constructs and data 
that can be directly used in the software.  The causal modeling methodology to explicitly and 
internally incorporate social factors into Level 3 PRA software is demonstrated in more detail in 
chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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Figure 4.1. Spectrum of social incorporation in accident consequence calculations. 
As shown in the middle of the spectrum on Figure 4.1, an approach that is somewhere 
between the two ends of the spectrum of social characteristic incorporation is the explicit 
integration of social factors externally to the risk calculations conducted by the Level 3 code. 
External consideration of social factors allows the PRA code to run as normal, except without 
any evacuation modeling.  Since the response model is the only part of the consequence 
calculation that has the potential to contain social information, there are some dependencies 
involved in running a consequence code with evacuation modeling and then applying social 
factors to the results.  Instead, the Level 3 PRA software is run with no population 
considerations, only the deterministic equations discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis.  If 
the output of this code is based on the source term, plume rise, transport, dispersion, and 
deposition only, then the result can be thought of as completely independent of the population’s 
reaction to this radiological hazard.  As explained in Chapter 2, social vulnerability is used in 
natural hazard research to quantify risk from the equation  
Risk = Hazard × Vulnerability    (4.1) 
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 Explicit incorporation of social factors can be accomplished this way by externally 
applying social vulnerability to the probabilistic hazard produced from Level 3 software.  Since 
social vulnerability is an aggregation of many social factors, and because the process of 
producing a social vulnerability index (SVI) is performed in such a way as to act as a term for 
damage susceptibility that are expected for different groups of people, the social vulnerability 
term can also be thought of as a surrogate for an evacuation model.  The methodological 
justification of this approach is explained in more detail in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2.  This 
chapter will give a quantitative example of the application of this external methodology and how 
to use social vulnerability as a surrogate for evacuation to determine the risk to a population due 
to an NPP accident.  This is an alternative approach to evacuation modeling that uses many 
assumptions and simplifications about response behavior.   
 Chapter 5 demonstrates the internal approach for explicit incorporation of social factors 
using a causal model to update evacuation parameters in WinMACCS. 
4.1 QUANTITATIVE EXAMPLE 
 The quantitative methodology described below follows a logical process of development 
and application.  The steps include: 
1. Calculation of a social vulnerability index (SVI) for the population within the plume 
exposure EPZ (about 10 miles) around SPS using ArcGIS. 
2. Calculation of nuclear radiation hazard due to a Long-Term Station Blackout (LTSBO) 
accident scenario. 
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a. Use of MACCS2 to calculate estimated dose, multiplied by CDF to generate dose 
frequency, to specific locations around the site. MACCS2 will be run without 
running the evacuation module.  
b. Use of ArcGIS to import MACCS2 tabular data as spatial data. 
3. Risk mapping: using feature classes of man-made hazards and social vulnerability. 
Each of these steps is covered in detail in sections 4.2 through 4.5 in order to illustrate the 
connection to Chapters 2 and 3, and to identify the benefits of integrating social vulnerability 
indices with a Level 3 PRA NPP accident analysis. 
 A practical application to incorporate social vulnerability with the radiological hazard of 
an NPP is presented.  The most recent full-scope PRA conducted by the US NRC was the 
SOARCA study, published in 2012 [6].  This study examined two NPPs: Surry Power Station 
located in Virginia, and Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station located in Pennsylvania.  The 
theory and methodology included in this thesis were applied to Surry Power Station (SPS) and 
the inputs from the SOARCA study were used.  While subsequent uncertainty analyses [3, 4] 
were performed for both Peach Bottom and Surry, SPS was selected because meteorological and 
population files were more readily accessible.  Surry and Peach Bottom were also part of the 
prior full-scope PRA, NUREG-1150 [5].  
 SPS is located on the south bank of the James River in Surry County in southeastern 
Virginia across from Jamestown and approximately 45 miles northwest of Virginia Beach.  The 
2001 Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) study used in SOARCA stated that that the area east of 
the James River is densely populated, while west of the river is more rural and the population is 
less dense [6]. 
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 The SPS reactor is a Westinghouse pressurized-water reactor (PWR) with a large 
containment structure.  Two on-site units generate 1,676 MW of electricity.  Unit 1 began 
operating in 1972 and Unit 2 in 1973 [7].  The SOARCA study claims that while PRA results are 
specific to SPS, they also serve as a good representative of other operating PWR plants in the 
US, and that full-scope PRA results for other plants may closely resemble those generated at SPS 
[8]. 
4.2 SOCIAL VULNERABILITY INDEX CALCULATION AND MAPPING 
 Worldwide, the most referenced social vulnerability index is Susan Cutter’s SoVI® [9].  
SoVI (using 2000 census data), originally used 42 variables for county-level calculations and 32 
variables for smaller census tracts [10].  SoVI utilizes principal components analysis (PCA) (See 
chapter 3), and therefore has an inductive structure for index calculation.  The latest iteration of 
Cutter’s SoVI has updated variables that are consistent with changes to the US Census data, 
while the total number of variables has remained the same (30 variables using 2009 data and 30 
variables using 2010 census data) [9].   
 Developing an SVI based on the SoVI method results in a more comprehensive 
estimation. The number of variables of SoVI improves the granularity of analysis, however, the 
SoVI method is a complex and time-intensive calculation [9].  For ease of use, and to provide the 
necessary tools for other NPPs around the country, the Environmental Systems Research 
Institute (Esri) uses a simplified form of Cutter’s SoVI method and has developed a public-use 
map layer, available in ArcGIS [11].  This method uses eight census attributes and calculates an 
unweighted sum of the indicators as a total social vulnerability score.  The eight attributes are 
indicators of age, gender, race, and income [12].  Table 4.1 displays the indicators and the 
rationale behind their use. 
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Table 4.1. Esri’s social vulnerability factors used to calculate a social vulnerability index [11]. 
Social Indicator Rationale 
Number of residents < 18 years old Require more assistance 
Number of residents > 65 years old Require more assistance 
Number of females Correlated with a lack of resources 
Number of non-whites Correlated with a lack of resources 
Total population Indicator of greatest number of people 
Number of housing units Indicator of greatest number of people 
Number of mobile homes Lower structural quality 
Mean house value Surrogate measure for income/ lack of 
resources 
 
 Younger residents (less than 18 years of age) and older residents (over 65 years of age) 
represent ‘dependent populations’.  According to Cutter [12], for the youngest and oldest 
members of the population, greater assistance will be required during hazard events.  These 
groups are also prone to respiratory distress from inhaled toxins, and have a slower recovery time 
in the event of disaster.  
 In social science literature, there is a correlation between populations either being female 
or non-white, with a comparable lack of resources, lack of social influence, and potential to live 
on less desired land [12].  These populations indicate a higher vulnerability by having less ability 
to recover quickly after a disaster [12]. 
 The density and number of housing units and total population, indicate areas that would 
be most impacted during a hazard event.  Total population is used, rather than population 
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density, to consider the consequence of a hazard.  Both of these indicators of population provide 
a basis for the ability to evacuate based on characteristics of interaction, congestion, and 
resilience [12]. 
 The number of mobile homes and mean house value are both indicators of structural 
shelter quality, and a surrogate measure of income.  Income data has not been included in SoVI 
at the census-block level, and so a high resolution SVI has not been developed using income as 
an indicator [12].  Ultimately, low economic status indicates a more vulnerable population due to 
a lack of resources, social disinvestment, and lack of personal transportation [12]. 
 The eight social indicators above represent the current data being used to estimate social 
vulnerability [12].  While Esri has published a simplistic view of social vulnerability, this 
research reveals that a comprehensive analysis of vulnerability would be Cutter’s SoVI® at the 
census block level [9].  The next step in this study is to develop a more comprehensive social 
vulnerability index around SPS instead of the SVI provided by Esri. 
 Individual social vulnerability indicators are calculated as a percentage within the 
respective census unit, which can be normalized to the state or county level.  The Esri map 
calculates vulnerability at the state level at scales greater than 1:3 million, and at the county level 
at scales less than 1:3 million [11].  For the purposes of this application, county comparisons are 
used, since the plume exposure EPZ is roughly 10 miles, correlating to roughly 1:200,000. 
 Divisions of census data, from largest to smallest areas, are [13]:  
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 State 
 County 
 Tract 
 Block Group 
 Census Block 
Esri’s SVI calculates vulnerability at the census block group [11].  Two methods for converting 
census data (percentages) into indexed numbers are used.  The first method can be applied to 
each of the eight attributes except for mean housing value.  For females, non-whites, young, old, 
housing units, mobile homes, and total population, the individual index is calculated in a two-
step process using equations 4.1 and 4.2 [12]. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 =  
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦
  (4.1) 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦
    (4.2) 
 In the above equations, factors are normalized relative to the county where they reside.  
For the mean housing value index score, a three-step process is used in equations 4.3, 4.4, and 
4.5 [12]. 
∆ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
−𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝  (4.3) 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ∆= ∆ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + |𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 ∆ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒|     (4.4) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ∆
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ∆
    (4.5) 
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From equation 4.2 and 4.5, the maximum index score for each factor is 1.000.  Total 
vulnerability is a simple, unweighted sum of all index scores.  Therefore, SVI can range from 
0.00 (least vulnerable) to 8.00 (most vulnerable). 
 Esri’s SVI calculation uses 2009 census data.  A geographic representation of the census 
block groups within the 10 mile EPZ around SPS is shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2. Social vulnerability within 10 miles of SPS. 
 The color scheme used in Figure 4.2 is based on splitting the range of possible SVIs into 
five quantiles.  Quantiles are classified using natural breaks (jenks), and represented using a 
graduated symbology in ArcGIS, and normalized on total population.  This creates equal 
numbers in each group [14]. Each color group in Figure 4.2 has the same number of census block 
groups within each county.  Each block group is assigned an individual SVI, a relative 
calculation to other block groups within its respective county.  The method of graduated colors is 
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used in all maps in this thesis to provide the reader with an idea of how the distribution of values 
is spread over the 10 mile EPZ.  As a caveat, the bounds of each graduated level are given on 
each map, and the range of each graduation is not the same. 
 The SVI shown in Figure 4.2 is hazard independent.  There is no information contained 
within the index associated with distance to water or elevation (flooding hazard), fault lines 
(seismic), or distance from Surry (nuclear accident).  SVI contains only demographic 
information, and can be applied to any hazard. 
4.3 HAZARD MAPPING 
 To generate a location-specific representation of a man-made hazard (generated by a NPP 
accident resulting in radiological release to the atmosphere), WinMACCS was used in order to 
utilize MACCS2 to model atmospheric phenomena, radionuclide decay, and exposure pathways.  
Protective measures (i.e., evacuation, shelter-in-place, KI pills) were not used in order to make 
this part of the analysis independent of population response.  The scenario considered for the 
application in this thesis is based on the SOARCA Unmitigated Long-Term Station Blackout 
(LTSBO) scenario and the representative source term that was part of the SOARCA study [6, 8].  
Other accident scenarios and source terms were generated using MELCOR in the SOARCA 
study, to include Mitigated LTSBO, sort-term station blackout (STSBO), thermally-induced 
steam generator tube rupture (TISGTR), and interfacing systems loss-of-coolant accident 
(ISLOCA) [6, 8].  The unmitigated LTSBO was chosen because it represents the most likely 
event, with a calculated CDF of 2×10
-5
, and because of continued analysis on the accident 
sequence (i.e., ongoing efforts to include uncertainty analysis) [8]. 
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 In order to consider the total risk for a man-made hazard of an operating NPP, all 
accident scenarios should be considered, with radionuclide inventory sampling from all source 
terms.  The nuclides were considered at plant shutdown from each accident, so source terms 
consisted of the same isotopes, but differed in the respective percentages of each isotope.  Other 
differences between accident scenarios are plume release times, plume heat contents, plume 
release heights, plume mass density, plume mass flow rate, and plume segment durations.  For 
the SOARCA study, 28 plume segments were used for the LTSBO accident [6].  The plume 
parameters are given in Volume 2 of the SOARCA study covering the integrated Surry analysis 
[6].  The methods introduced in this thesis allows for further analysis to be performed on other 
accident scenario source terms. 
 The man-made hazard posed by a NPP accident is radiation exposure to the public.  
Latent cancer fatalities or prompt fatalities are the ultimate consequences to public health, while 
the hazard itself is irradiation through the modeled exposure pathways.  Therefore, dose, 
measured in Sieverts (Sv), is used as a measure for this specific man-made hazard, and the 
measure is not considering fatalities.  MACCS2 allows for a polar output of peak dose for 
radially defined grid spaces.  The radial and angular dimensions (resolution) were provided in 
the best practices guide from the SOARCA study [48].   
 Peak dose at an (r, θ) location, as an output from MACCS2, estimates peak (total) dose at 
a given location.  The location-specific dose is the result of all direct exposure pathways at that 
location (not including the ingestion pathway) [15].  Because this calculation is based on a 
specific location and not on interaction with the population, MACCS2 does not accurately 
consider the population around the plant.  This output does, however, consider mitigative 
strategies that are triggered by exceeding user-specified dose thresholds (i.e., KI pills and 
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relocation) [15].  For the purposes of this application, no dose threshold mitigative actions were 
established through WinMACCS.  The maximum number of results from the location-specific 
peak dose output (r, θ) is 32, so with a resolution of 64 angles and 12 radii, WinMACCS was run 
a total of 24 times to produce output files to cover all 10 miles of the plume exposure EPZ. 
 Location specific peak dose was generated using the LTSBO scenario from SOARCA 
[6], which does not consider the population input file or any evacuation modeling.  This peak 
dose represents the hazard to any persons located in the area.   For example, if one individual 
were to be located in one place the entire part of the EARLY module of MACCS2 (EARLY is 
seven days in SOARCA), this estimates the dose he would receive.  The results of the peak dose 
estimates that extend to 10 miles from the plant are given in Appendix B.  
 In order to visualize the values generated from MACCS2, the grid system defined in the 
accident consequence code was translated in ArcGIS using Model Builder. The Model Builder 
model is shown in Appendix C.  This model was used to translate the MACCS2 outputs into 
their associated geographic regions on the map.  The Model Builder model sequence draws 
multiple buffers at the radial distances from SPS as defined in the SOARCA study.  The radial 
buffers are then split by the 64 angular divisions, centered on true North.  A unique index is 
assigned to each cell that was created by this process.  The grid system developed through this 
process is shown in Figure 4.3 below. 
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Figure 4.3.Grid system developed in ArcGIS. 
 Once the unique cells are created in ArcGIS, a ‘table join’ of dose data and the cell 
indices is performed, associating the cell-specific hazard information with the shapefile of the 
spatial grid seen in Figure 4.3.   
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Figure 4.4. Visualization of radiation hazard around Surry Power Station due to LTSBO. 
 This representation of man-made hazard is probabilistic and scenario-driven. A critical 
part of the scenario for plume modeling is an explicit consideration of weather conditions for a 
given geographic location.  Weather sampling and incorporation of uncertainty for MACCS2 
parameters allows for detailed and probabilistic scenarios to be developed. The result of weather 
sampling creates the visualization seen in Figure 4.4.  Technically, in order to incorporate 
frequency into this definition of radiological hazard, the CDF associated with this accident 
sequence must be multiplied (2×10
-5
 for LTSBO).  
 The results shown in Figure 4.4 indicate that a radiological hazard from SPS is not 
spatially uniform.  If social vulnerability is not considered for risk calculations, this distribution 
of dose might erroneously be considered risk; however, the progression of this hazard to form a 
risk to the public has not yet considered, and must be done so with the social vulnerability term.  
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As can be seen, the radiation hazard is highest near the plant, but because of the weather 
sampling, higher levels of dose are to the northeast, southeast, and west.   
4.4 INTEGRATIVE RISK MAPPING IN GIS 
 Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 above describe the process of creating separate maps for social 
vulnerability and radiological hazard.  Separately, social vulnerability and radiological hazard 
mapping do not provide an accurate estimation of risk due to the lack of consideration of their 
interactions, but the combination of these maps would result in risk, shown here again as 
equation 4.6. 
Risk  = Hazard  × Vulnerability    (4.6) 
 In order to aggregate radiation hazard and social vulnerability, a new overlay was created 
in GIS.  The Intersect tool calculates the geometric intersection of both layers, and combines the 
attributes of each layer as an output.  The intersection of hazard and vulnerability in ArcGIS was 
taken as an unweighted multiplication, as implied by equation 4.6.  The result was a new layer, 
shown in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5. Integrated risk map accounting for both hazard and vulnerability. 
 Figure 4.5 indicates that radiation risk to the public is highest near the plant.  Risk is now 
considered as the combination of social vulnerability and radiation hazard, which has shifted the 
location specific areas of risk. The two highest categories of risk reside within three miles of the 
plant.  The middle level of risk is encompassed within five miles, with the exception of the 
western region, which has been expanded due to a higher social vulnerability, as well as a higher 
probability of wind blowing in that direction.  There are some areas in the 7-10 mile radial ring 
that vary between the lowest risk and the second lowest level of risk.   
 Based on this methodology, the numbers generated by the intersection of hazard and 
vulnerability are to be considered from the perspective of risk, and should not be confused with 
an actual measure of potential dose.  Even though the unit for this risk is in Sieverts (Sv), which 
should also be multiplied by CDF (2×10
-5
) to represent dose frequency, the SVI represents the 
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level to which the population will be affected by the hazard, and the SVI generated here is 
relative to the county for each block group. For instance, the mean SVI within the 10 mile EPZ is 
2.81, with a maximum possible value of 8.00 and a minimum of 0.00, as shown in Figure 4.2.  If 
all SVI values are normalized to the maximum value of 1.00, then less vulnerable areas have the 
potential to receive less dose and more vulnerable areas a potential for more dose (up to a 
multiple of 1 time the hazard).  This means that no SVI value will increase risk above the 
original hazard value.  This is validated in the fact that the hazard generated in Figure 4.4 did not 
use any mitigative or protective measures, and so the worst consequence progression possible 
resembles Figure 4.4, with a multiple of 1. 
 Risk, as a function of both hazard and vulnerability from equation 4.6 shown in Figure 
4.5, is composed of discrete values, while hazard and vulnerability are both continuous variables.  
The discrete graduated color scheme can be misleading, depending on the amount of colors that 
are selected, and where the breaks between color levels occur (for example, in this thesis natural 
breaks are used).  Using the process of normalization described above, the highest risk value is 
626 mSv.  According to the most recent EPA PAG, a projected dose greater than 10 mSv should 
result in the initiation of evacuation [16].  The lowest value for the highest category of risk 
(when normalized), is 13.8 mSv, and so, given these results, the current keyhole evacuation 
practice of a two-mile radius and five miles downwind seems very reasonable.  
 Figure 4.5, in conjunction with analysis tools in ArcGIS, also allows for statistical 
analysis of risk distributed geographically.  The Intersect overlay created 1146 unique shapes 
within the 10-mile EPZ.  The risk (hazard × vulnerability) is distributed as shown in Figure 4.6 
from ArcGIS. 
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Figure 4.6. Risk distribution within the 10-mile EPZ 
 With the statistical information about all areas covered by emergency preparedness 
policies, decision makers can rank specific populations that are in the greatest probabilistic risk, 
and focus mitigative efforts directly at these populations.  For example, the first 128 intersect 
areas most at risk lie within the first two radial rings used in WinMACCS (within 0.52 km of 
SPS).  In fact, all of the regions that are associated with risk greater than the mean are within 1 
mile of the plant.  Ranking risk areas outside of 1 mile, decision makers can identify 
neighborhoods (if the SVI resolution is to the census block) within their area of governance to 
provide extra resources for emergency preparedness purposes. 
 The integrated risk map shown in Figure 4.5 can be further advanced to consider the 
highest hazard within each census block group assigned as the hazard to an individual census 
block.  Using the ArcGIS geoprocessing tool ‘spatial join’, the maximum dose (hazard) located 
within each block group can be associated [16].  Other options of spatial join include associating 
the minimum, mean, or standard deviation of all the cells generated from WinMACCS within 
each block group.  The result of the highest dose from MACCS2 assigned to each block group is 
shown in Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.7. Integrated risk map determined by highest hazard per block group. 
 This figure shows a much different visualization of risk. Figure 4.7 shows risk as defined 
as the worst (highest) hazard in each block group.  The boundaries of each of these areas may be 
more useful for decision makers, where the level of risk might be used to communicate with 
constituents of larger geographical areas clearly defined by political boundaries.  The risk trend 
is similar for both Figures 4.5 and 4.7; however, in Figure 4.5 “pockets” of lower risk areas 
surrounded by higher risk (and vice versa) are aggregated and oversimplified into the rest of the 
block group. 
 Ranking can be performed using this form of risk mapping as well.  Figure 4.8 shows the 
statistics for all block groups in the 10-mile EPZ. 
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Figure 4.8. Risk distribution of block groups within the 10-mile EPZ. 
Based on this risk ranking, the highest risk is obviously in the block group where SPS is located.  
Subsequent block groups that rank high for risk are located west, east, south, and north in that 
order.  However, block groups to the north that are further from SPS actually rank higher than 
others that are a similar distance away in other directions.  This is due to both the non-uniform 
distribution of hazard around the site, and the variance in social vulnerability between all block 
groups. 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 While evacuation parameters were not internally updated with social factors in this 
section, a surrogate for evacuation modeling was used in the form of social vulnerability and 
then risk was estimated.  This research proposes a methodological approach and applies it for the 
integration of an accident consequence code, MACCS2, with Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS) to visualize risk information and to explicitly and externally integrate social factors with 
the output of MACCS2. It presents a first-time approach for integrating the results from 
WinMACCS into a spatial analysis and visualization software (ArcGIS).  It is also the first to 
integrate probabilistic risk assessment and social vulnerability.  The resulting risk maps (Figures 
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4.5 and 4.7) will help decision makers identify areas within the Surry EPZ that require more 
assistance or resources because it has been probabilistically determined that they have more 
socio-technical risk than other areas.   
 This format of risk representation is helpful for ranking areas of higher or lower risk.  
Quantitative ranking between different geographic areas allows for direct risk information to be 
used in assisting decision makers to have the greatest effect on risk reduction to the population. 
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CHAPTER 5: EXPLICIT INCORPORATION OF SOCIAL FACTORS INTO LEVEL 3 
PRA: INTERNAL APPROACH BY LINKING BAYESIAN BELIEF NETWORK OF 
SOCIAL VULNERABILITY AND EVACUATION PARAMETERS 
 As the previous chapter exhibits, a social vulnerability index can be used as a surrogate 
term to represent the decisions and outcomes of individual population response when exposed to 
a radiological hazard.  The external method of incorporating social factors in evacuation 
modeling assists in ranking population subgroups, that are location-specific, based on the risk 
they face from a hypothetical nuclear accident.   
 The results from the external approach allow for risk ranking similar to the ranking based 
on CDF or LERF in that the risk is dependent on frequency, but not on ultimate consequence 
(prompt fatalities and latent cancer fatalities).  In order to explicitly incorporate social 
information internally through Level 3 PRA and retain the consequences calculated, which can 
be compared to the NRC’s quantitative health objectives (QHOs), different results than those 
generated in the risk mapping section of this research must be collected from MACCS2, and 
those results need to take into account the evacuation modeled within the PRA software.   
5.1 EVACUATION COHORTS AND PARAMETERS 
 To determine whether evacuation parameters in MACCS2 can be updated to explicitly 
reflect the different populations surrounding a NPP, available data and assumptions used in 
evacuation modeling are analyzed.   This determines the feasibility of applying social factors or 
information to the variables that govern evacuation modeling based on the data that is available 
from current nuclear or non-nuclear research.  MACCS2 uses multiple evacuation scenarios that 
are called cohorts.  A cohort is a defined segment of the population.  The latest version of 
MACCS2 allows for up to 20 cohorts to represent the response of the entire population.  Each 
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cohort groups people who are expected to respond in a similar manner during the emergency 
phase of the EARLY module.  The parameters that can differ between cohorts are [1]: 
 Delay to shelter 
 Delay to evacuation 
 Speed of evacuation (defined for early, middle, and late phases of the emergency) 
 Duration of the Beginning Phase of Evacuation 
 Duration of the Middle Phase of Evacuation 
 Each of these parameters can be defined uniquely for each evacuation cohort.  The 
SOARCA study modeled evacuation using six cohorts.  Six cohorts was the maximum desired 
for model run time, and not based on evacuation accuracy [2].  Previous Level 3 PRAs only used 
two cohorts.  The cohorts for Surry Power Station were: 
Table 5.1. Evacuation cohorts used in the SOARCA study [1]. 
Cohort Region Description Population 
1 0-10 miles General Public residing within the EPZ.  
Assumed 1 hour to prepare to evacuate. 
88,590 
2 10-20 miles Shadow evacuation of people beyond the EPZ.  
Assumed to be 20% of the population outside 
the EPZ. 
63,171 
3 0-10 miles Schools, including elementary, middle, and 
high schools, within the EPZ. 
23,262 
4 0-10 miles Special Facilities, including hospitals, nursing 
homes, assisted living communities, and 
prisons. 
844 
5 0-10 miles Tail evacuation defined as the last 10% of the 
public to evacuate from the EPZ 
7,232 
6 0-10 miles Non-evacuating population assumed to be 0.5% 
of the population. 
603 
 
129 
 
 As many cohorts as needed to represent the response characteristics of the population 
should be defined in order to be accurate [2].  With increased computing power, increasing the 
number of cohorts become more practical.  In fact, the concept of dividing the general public 
cohort into multiple cohorts with unique response characteristics to represent the evacuation 
distribution has already been suggested [2].  Response characteristics can be better modeled by 
using multiple cohorts to address different delay times as people enter the roadways over a 
period of time, not just the masses starting evacuation all at the same time.  Recently, non-
SOARCA related studies have used as many as 12 cohorts [2].  However, it has also been stated 
that there is “diminishing value” in establishing a large number of cohorts because the smaller 
differences among them will overlap within the evacuation period and the benefits of using 
multiple cohorts is reduced [2].  
 Sandia National Laboratory, in conjunction with the NRC, has also suggested that rather 
than having a cohort like the schools, cohort be simply a fraction of the total population, the 
newest version of WinMACCS has the capability to define each cohort precisely within the grid 
element wherein the facility is located [2].  This capability, along with the increased number of 
possible cohorts, shows the possibility of creating an evacuation model that is not only site-
specific but also specific to the demographics of the population living within ten miles of a 
nuclear power plant. 
 SOARCA thoroughly discusses the assumptions made for the cohorts listed above and 
the choice of governing parameters for each.  A 10% shadow evacuation is based on a review of 
over 20 evacuation time estimate (ETE) studies and national telephone surveys.  The Surry ETE 
study determined the amount of time for 90% of the population to evacuate, with the tail 
evacuation cohort defined as the last 10% to evacuate.  The general public cohort is assumed to 
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prepare to mobilize in one hour based on evacuation research and was considered reasonable, 
based on previous large-scale evacuations [1].  However, it has also been identified that the 
public mobilizes over varying lengths of time; some are ready to leave at a moment’s notice, 
while for others it may take much longer than one hour. Speed of evacuation was calculated 
based on the distance to evacuate (10 miles), total time to evacuate from the 2001 ETE study, 
and the preparation time before evacuation [1].  The response timeline for all evacuation cohorts 
is shown in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1.  Unmitigated LTSBO Emergency Response Timeline [1]. 
 These assumptions and estimates are based on evacuations that are not necessarily 
specific to nuclear evacuations.  The delay to evacuate for cohort 1 was deemed consistent with 
chemical agent emergencies [1], [3].  Some assumptions are also based on generic, non-location 
specific estimates [4].  Determination of the time to delay to shelter, delay to evacuate, speed of 
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evacuation, and duration of evacuation phases should ideally be based on geographically and 
socially specific information for each NPP.  While some of this information has already been 
incorporated through each plant’s ETE study (school mobilization, for instance), many other 
evacuation parameters are generic because of the relatively small number of cohorts. 
 However, not all of the evacuation parameters need explicit social consideration.  
Evacuation speed is dependent only on roadways and physical infrastructure.  When one vehicle 
is limited in speed by the vehicle in front of it, social characteristics do not remain important, and 
congested roads become dominant.  It has been shown that evacuation speed decreases as the 
number of vehicles on the road increases and roads become congested [5].  This is already 
considered in SOARCA as the first 15 minutes of evacuation have higher travel speeds than the 
remainder of the evacuation, and then again toward the tail of evacuation as more vehicles are 
clear of major roadways [1]. 
 The 2010 ETE study for SPS determined that the delay time for evacuation of the people 
within the EPZ resembles a normal distribution based on data collected through telephone 
surveys [6].  This distribution is shown in Figure 5.2.  Other such point estimates or distributions 
can be determined for all other evacuation parameters. 
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Figure 5.2. Time distribution for time to prepare to evacuate [6]. 
The usefulness of entering a probabilistic distribution for the delay to evacuate parameter is not 
as powerful as could be hoped, however.  The distribution is applied uniformly across the entire 
EPZ, but without explicitly defining how social factors actually affect the delay time.   
 For example, if the data from the phone interviews conducted to arrive to Figure 5.2 had 
been kept location specific, then the time to prepare for evacuation could be compared to the 
location-specific social vulnerability index, and regression analysis would determine whether 
there is a direct correlation between SVI and preparation (delay to evacuate) time.  However, the 
ETE study compiled all data for the population within the EPZ without retaining location 
information such as county or zip code. 
 Figure 5.2 is based on a five-step sequence of events for individuals to accomplish in 
order to get to the point of leaving their home.  The steps include [6]: 
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1. Receive notification 
2. Prepare to leave work 
3. Travel home 
4. Prepare to leave home 
5. Depart to evacuate 
Different types of residents and different times of the day or week determine whether all or some 
of these activities are accomplished in order to be prepared to evacuate.  To determine the effect 
different social characteristics have on delay to shelter or delay to evacuate, their effects on the 
above steps need to be identified. 
5.2 INTERNAL INCORPORATION FRAMEWORK 
 To explicitly change the evacuation parameters for each cohort, or create more to better 
represent the population based on specific social information about each subgroup, three 
methods have been identified: 1) a causal model based on theory; 2) a model based on regression 
analysis; or 3) a model of influence using a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN).  Each of these 
options is discussed below. 
 The conceptual framework to update evacuation parameters in MACCS2 is shown in 
Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3. Conceptual framework showing how individual social factors affect evacuation 
parameters in MACCS2. 
 The “conceptual factors” and “social factors” levels in Figure 5.3 have not yet been 
determined and are simply placeholders.  Similarly, the hypothetical lines of direct and indirect 
causality (represented by solid and dashed lines) are also just representations of causal 
relationships.  Ideally, the choice of specific social and conceptual factors and the causal paths 
from social factor to conceptual factor to evacuation parameter should be based on a 
foundational, defendable theory.  The remainder of this chapter will explore the theoretical 
causal models and other potential methods for developing the relationships between social 
factors and the evacuation parameters in MACCS2. 
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5.3 CAUSAL MODELS 
 The ideal method for explicitly integrating social information into Level 3 PRA internally 
would be through a validated theoretical causal modeling of social factors in order to identify the 
relationship that each has with different aspects of evacuation behavior.  Systematic causal 
modeling of the underlying social factors and updating the existing evacuation parameters using 
SVI is a potential method to integrate social theories related to social vulnerability into Level 3 
PRA estimations.  Several theoretical frameworks were established in the late 1980s after the 
Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, which occurred in 1979, and two such models are described 
below.   
 Johnson [7] used logistic regression analysis based on a hypothetical accident and survey 
data to create a causal model.  This model is shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4. Model of evacuation-decision making [7]. 
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The model is targeted at determining an individual’s intention to evacuate.  While the links are 
quantified using regression analysis on survey results, the model is theoretical and validated by 
the data that was collected.  The model in Figure 5.4 is said to have three exogenous variables 
(location, stage in life cycle, and social status) and three endogenous variables (attitudes toward 
nuclear power, perception of risk, and evacuation intention) [7].  For the purposes of this 
research, location, age, and social status can be used from the SVI calculation and by using 
ArcGIS to determine distance to the NPP.  However, this model does not attempt to show the 
causal relationships to delay to shelter or delay to evacuation.  This model may be a good starting 
point for establishing the causal relationships among social factors and a non-evacuating cohort 
in MACCS2, but is not all-inclusive to update all evacuation parameters. 
 Perry [8] created a conceptual causal model similar to Johnson’s, but this model is more 
robust and comprehensive. The model is shown in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5. Conceptual model for predicting evacuation decision [8]. 
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 Perry’s model is generic to natural disasters.  Some of the elements in Figure 5.5 are 
addressed in Johnson’s research and thrown out because they do not apply to a nuclear accident 
(e.g., environmental cues are not present during a radiation hazard).  Johnson also notes that the 
result of a nuclear disaster will produce an over-response to evacuation orders because of the risk 
perception difference between a radioactive hazard and a natural hazard.  This may be related to 
the lack of environmental cues.  Perry’s model, while considering more societal factors, is still 
not all-inclusive to update all parameters in MACCS2, but seems much more comprehensive to 
updating the non-evacuating population. 
 Even in fire evacuation research, an area important for building code guidance and egress 
route design, “behavioral facts” have been identified but there is no “overarching, complete 
conceptual model for human behavior in fire” [9].  The literature review on theoretical causal 
models resulted in the conclusion that these models are available [7, 8, 9], but are not sufficient 
in changing the evacuation model for all parameters in MACCS2.  The overwhelming majority 
of research in the area of evacuation prediction is linked to the decision to evacuate, and not the 
time it takes to make the decision or prepare to evacuate. 
5.4 REGRESSION MODELS 
 Regression analysis identifies the relationships between a target variable, such as the 
decision to evacuate as seen in the models above, and the independent variables that affect that 
target variable, such as age, social status, and location from Johnson’s model shown in Figure 
5.4.  This is quantified in a p-value; the p-value is the probability of observing a difference in 
data by random variation alone [10].  Therefore, a low p-value (typically less than 0.05) shows 
statistical significance and a high p-value (greater than 0.10) shows weak association. 
138 
 
 Correlation analysis, on the other hand, measures the interdependence of random 
variables based on how much of a change in one variable is explained by a change in another 
[10].  The issue with regression and correlation analysis is that statistical significance from 
regression analysis implies correlation, but correlation does not imply a causal relationship.  
However, this method of linking independent variables to dependent variables is still useful 
when hard evidence is not present. 
 Regression analysis on evacuation due to a nuclear emergency has been conducted in a 
limited capacity.  Johnson did this to support his model after TMI [7].  Perry compared the 
results of nuclear, flooding, and volcano evacuations with the use of regression analysis [11].  
However, much of the regression analysis in evacuation research has dealt with hurricanes [12-
15]. 
 The results of regression analysis on hurricane evacuation give the following general 
results: 
 Age, presence of children or elderly, gender, disability, race and ethnicity, and income 
has shown to influence evacuation outcomes [16]. 
 Being in the EPZ, and living in a single-family dwelling can also affect the decision to 
evacuate [17]. 
 The main reasons for not evacuating during a hurricane were that it did not seem a 
serious threat and a person’s confidence in their safety in their own home.  Main 
predictors of evacuation were having a child, renters, living in a home for less than five 
years, and living in a poor neighborhood [18] 
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These results, which can link some of the demographic data used in calculating the SVI from the 
previous section, show correlation to the non-evacuating portion of the population in the form of 
making a decision to evacuate. 
 One of the few studies that analyzed the amount of time to make the decision to evacuate 
(relating to delay time) was Sorensen [19] in 1991.  The major factor that Sorensen claimed had 
the greatest effect on time of departure was the time of warning receipt.  However, this study was 
related to a hazardous materials fire, with no formal communications network established.  It is 
expected that all residents within the plume exposure EPZ will receive the notification of general 
emergency via sirens that have 99% reliability at SPS [1]. 
 The same result is reached when searching for relevant regression analysis studies as the 
causal model search: there has been research (most of it non-nuclear) concerning the decision to 
evacuate, and very little that attempts to identify the factors affecting the time it takes to 
evacuate.  Regression analysis from non-nuclear evacuation applied to nuclear evacuation is also 
less reliable due to a large disparity on risk perception. 
 Perry [11] compared survey results among the TMI evacuation and volcanoes and 
flooding.  The most important reasons for not evacuating in a non-nuclear disaster were not 
believing real danger existed and staying to protect the house.  The most important reasons for 
not evacuating from TMI were that there was no order to evacuate (a very small reason in the 
non-nuclear cases), the belief that no real danger existed, and that their home was a safe distance 
away (also related to believing that no real danger existed) [11].  Clearly some of the results from 
non-nuclear analysis are applicable in the nuclear area, but because of the low number of papers 
regarding nuclear evacuation, we are left having to share analysis and data from other hazards 
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research; something similar to the approach used in the Reactor Safety Study to estimate risk not 
on statistical information from NPPs, but borrowed from other industries to determine failure 
probabilities of system components. 
 The regression analysis from hurricane papers is helpful, but not directly applicable due 
to differences in warning systems, types of damage, and risk perception.  The next step is to 
apply an influence diagram such as BBN in order to use non-nuclear information in a different 
context, especially where risk perception can be drastically different. 
5.5 INTRODUCTION TO BBN 
 A Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is an influence diagram that represents causal 
connections that have uncertainty associated with them.  These connections show the path of 
influence from one variable to another.  The influence is mathematically given through 
conditional probabilities [20].  For Figure 5.6 below, the probability that A is true is dependent 
on whether B1, B2, and B3 are true. 
 
Figure 5.6. A Bayesian Belief Network [20]. 
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 Both regression analysis and BBN can be predictive, and there are ways to 
mathematically convert correlated variable to conditional probabilities [20].  However, the most 
beneficial aspect of using BBN in this context is the ability to apply “soft” influence (something 
not based on hard data), uncertainty (when data is only partially reliable), and even expert 
opinion.  This is because the paths of influence in BBN are conditional probabilities, which 
update the likelihood of a target node (A) given the evidence submitted from the parent node 
(B2). 
 BBN models can be as advanced or complex as the system they are modeling.  Figure 5.7 
below shows a BBN model for the evacuation of a sporting event. 
 
Figure 5.7. Model for venue evacuation [21]. 
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As this figure shows, multiple target nodes can be defined, which assists in the goal of this 
research to update not one evacuation parameter, but all parameters, given the evidence of social 
factors in a specific location. 
5.6 QUANTIFICATION OF A BBN MODEL FOR EVACUATION PARAMETERS 
 Since no causal model or regression analysis was identified at predicting evacuation 
response for all evacuation parameters, this practical application will focus on updating the non-
evacuating population cohort used in MACCS2 based on the model developed by Johnson [7].  
Data for the development of SVI from the previous section is used as parent nodes (evidence), 
while the target node is the decision to evacuate.  The strength of the influence paths are chosen 
based on literature review from the theoretical causal model and regression analysis sections [7, 
17, 18].  These relationships are summarized in table 5.2. 
Table 5.2.Relationships between social variables and evacuation intent. 
Indicator used in SVI Relationship to decision to 
evacuate 
Relevance 
Residents under 18 (children) Predictor of evacuation [17, 
18] 
Based on hurricane studies, 
but rational is relevant to any 
emergency (high relevance) 
Residents over 65 (elderly) Less likely to evacuate [18] Based on ability and the 
likelihood to have lived in 
their current residence for a 
longer time (high relevance) 
Females No correlation found   
Non-white residents No correlation found [17]  Some studies claimed it was 
not applicable [17], while 
other linked it to lower income 
[7], and others said that it 
affected trust and language 
proficiency to be less likely to 
leave. 
Number of housing units More likely Indicative of renters and 
higher number of transient 
populations [17] (medium 
relevance) 
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Total population More likely Same as housing units 
Mobile homes More likely Mostly based on the damage 
that a mobile home can 
withstand in a hurricane, but 
also linked to low income 
(medium relevance) 
Average house value Negative correlation (higher 
house value -> less likely to 
evacuate) [17] 
Based on hurricane damage, 
not radiation hazard (low 
relevance) 
Distance from NPP Negative correlation (further 
from plant -> less likely to 
evacuate) [7, 17] 
Based on nuclear study (very 
high relevance) 
Table 5.2 (cont.) 
 Tools used for the BBN development and analysis were the University of Pittsburgh’s 
GeNIe software, and ArcGIS was used to select and perform statistical analysis on the social 
vulnerability indicators for the census block groups that lie within the 10-mile EPZ.  The mean 
index values of the 83 block groups in the EPZ are shown in table 5.3. 
Table 5.3.Mean values of independent variables used in the BBN. 
Indicator Residents 
under 18 
(children) 
Residents 
over 65 
(elderly) 
Females Non-
white 
residents 
Total 
population 
Number 
of 
housing 
units 
Mobile 
homes 
Average 
house 
value 
Distance 
from 
NPP 
(miles) 
Mean 
Score 
0.3484 0.3590 0.3598 0.3480 0.3612 0.3619 0.1140 0.5769 5 
 
 Since BBN performs calculations based on discrete states, individual factors are 
discretized by having two states: a high state (above the mean) and a low state (below the mean).  
Once this was done, the intermediate nodes were defined based on competing factors.  For 
instance, since a greater elderly population should mean a lower likelihood of evacuation but a 
population with more children implies a higher likelihood, the truth table for a child node from 
these two parent nodes would take the form below: 
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Table 5.4.One of six truth tables developed for the BBN model. 
Residents > 65 Few 
 
Many 
 
Residents < 18 Few Many Few Many 
Less likely to 
evacuate 
0.5 0 1 0.5 
More likely to 
evacuate 
0.5 1 0 0.5 
 
 All other truth tables are provided in Appendix D.  For social factors that did not have the 
same relevance, a scaling factor was used to emphasize the influence of more relevant data.  The 
scaling factor consisted of integers 1-5 based on: 
very low (1), low (2), medium (3), high (4) and very high (5) relevancy. 
This was performed for two different census block groups.  The BBN is shown in Figure 5.8. 
 
Figure 5.8. BBN model developed in GeNIe, based on Johnson’s model for nuclear evacuation. 
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Females and non-white populations were not included in the BBN because no conclusive 
statistical significance could be identified through the literature review.  Total population was 
used as a variable while number of housing units was not because both indicate similar qualities 
in the SVI calculation.   
 The two census block groups that were selected for comparison were the block group that 
SPS is located on and a block group across the James River to the northeast with a low 
vulnerability score.  Since the actual social information contained in the original value (99.5% 
modeled to evacuate in SOARCA) is unknown, the difference between census block groups will 
show how much more or less likely one block group is to evacuate than another.  Essentially, 
there are dependencies between the value calculated and the original that are not identifiable.  It 
was found that the census block group where SPS is located has a likelihood of 0.642 (updated 
from 0.5) while the lower SVI block group further away has a likelihood of 0.427.  These 
numbers are only used as a reference, since they updated a generic 50/50 chance, and SOARCA 
assumes a 99.5/0.5 chance of evacuation.  The same differences should be observed, however.  
This analysis shows that the higher vulnerability population near the NPP is over 33% more 
likely to evacuate. 
 GeNIe also allows for conducting sensitivity analysis.  It is helpful to understand what 
nodes in the BBN model have the greatest effect on the target node.  For instance, the block 
group containing Surry Power Station has the following qualities: high total population, close 
distance from the NPP, many elderly residents, many households with children, a large number 
of mobile homes, and low average house value.  These qualities constitute a high social 
vulnerability index.  However, Figure 5.9 shows that “stage in life cycle” and “nuclear power 
attitude” have the largest effect on the evacuation intention, followed by “risk perception.”  The 
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sensitivity analysis shown in this figure is generated based on the specific combination of these 
qualities.  A decision maker is shown that there is no sensitivity in the “location” node because a 
high total population and being located near the plant both contribute positively in encouraging 
individuals in this area to evacuate during an emergency.  Also, due to the large number of 
elderly and children residing in this block group, “stage in life cycle” and “nuclear power 
attitude” have the most effect on the evacuation decision. 
 
Figure 5.9. Sensitivity analysis conducted on a block group with high vulnerability. 
 In contrast, Figure 5.10 shows the sensitivity analysis for another block group, with high 
total population, far from the plant, small number of elderly, large number of children, small 
number of mobile homes, and low average house value.  These social qualities show a very 
different sensitivity in the BBN nodes.   
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Figure 5.10.  Sensitivity analysis conducted on a block group further from the site. 
Figure 5.10 shows that the elderly population and those with children in this block group do not 
have as great of an effect on the evacuation decision for the area as a whole, and location and 
social status do.  Comparisons of each census block group can be conducted not only for whether 
they are more or less likely to evacuate, but also which individual social factors have the 
potential for increasing or decreasing this likelihood the most. 
5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 Updating emergency response parameters in WinMACCS was also shown using BBN.  
The relationships of the BBN were theoretically validated and provide a systematic view of 
underlying social vulnerability that would impact the quality of evacuation. The results of the 
BBN model show how much more or less likely a specific population is to evacuate, which can 
be used to update the non-evacuating cohort used in WinMACCS.  Sensitivity analysis also 
shows that certain factors play important roles in the generation of this likelihood to evacuate, 
given the specific demographic variables in each location.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
 Failure mechanisms in some of the world’s worst nuclear accidents, such as Three Mile 
Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, have emerged from the interactions of social and technical 
systems. Due to the failure to take common cause failures and dependencies into consideration, 
the “undesirable environmental and social consequences” of these accidents were not 
anticipated. CCF modeling is one of the most important areas of research in the field of 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). PRA is a systematic tool for estimating risk from the 
interactions of equipment failure and human error. Classical PRA methods have been used at 
every nuclear power plant (NPP) worldwide, utilizing the probabilistic methods of fault trees and 
event trees to calculate risk, and now serves as a main pillar of risk-informed regulatory 
frameworks in the United States [1]. PRA is being used to identify root causes of system failure, 
and can be used to reduce unnecessary conservatism in Emergency Preparedness, Planning and 
Response efforts of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). In the aftermath of nuclear 
accidents, companies and regulatory agencies are beginning to adopt methods, both socio-
technical and systematic, and models (PRA) for considering multidisciplinary chains of events. 
Because of the complex nature of industry problems, single process or single effect modeling 
techniques are not adequate; therefore, this thesis proposes a first-of-its-kind combination of 
spatial analysis using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Level 3 PRA using the NRC’s 
MACCS2 code.  
 Explicit incorporation of social and organizational factors into Level 1 PRA has been 
theoretically and methodologically improved and now is in the process of development for 
nuclear power plant (NPP) applications [2-8].  The goal of this thesis is to initiate the same 
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paradigm of research for Level 3 PRA.   In summary the contributions of this research study can 
be categorized into three groups: 
1) Theoretical Contributions: 
a. Development of theoretical foundations on how and why social vulnerability 
constructs and frameworks could be adopted and implemented to an NPP accident 
consequence analysis. This research is the first of its kind to bridge the gap 
between social vulnerability theories and nuclear power risk analysis.  Similar 
studies have been conducted for other man-made, technological hazards such as 
chemical-industry parks, but almost all are concerned with natural hazards.  A 
thorough review of literature supports this contribution. 
2) Methodological Contributions: 
a. Combining results of an accident consequence code (MACCS2) with the 
quantification of social vulnerability in the form of a social vulnerability index 
(SVI). 
b. Integrating the results of an accident consequence code (MACCS2) with 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to visualize risk information and to 
explicitly and externally integrate social factors with MACCS2 through 
evacuation parameters.  
c. Explicitly and internally merging social vulnerability indices with evacuation 
module in MACCS2 using Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). 
3) Practical Contributions:  
a. Explicit consideration of location-specific social factors in Level 3 PRA that will 
help develop: 
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i. More realistic modeling of population response and, therefore, more 
accurate estimation of NPP severe accident risk. 
ii. More advanced management of NPPs severe accident risk by facilitating 
the analysis of the effects of change in risk due to changes in the 
underlying socio-technical risk contributing factors.  This will certainly 
help advance models and applications of risk-informed EPPR, particularly 
in focusing on location-specific populations who rank highest with respect 
to risk. 
b. Visualizing location-specific radiological risk around an NPP that will improve 
risk communication with public and policy makers. 
 Through a spatial integration of Level 3 PRA outputs and social vulnerability indices, 
actual risk information and census data can be used to support location-specific decision making 
regarding Emergency Planning, Preparedness, and Response (EPPR). With proper integration of 
social models and Level 3 hazard information, the integrated spatial risk analysis approach 
introduced herein can significantly improve risk estimations for decision makers, while 
facilitating a more effective resource allocation and mitigation strategy for local, state, and 
federal agencies.  For example, by combining social vulnerability information with risk 
information, importance measures [9] can be used to identify the most ‘at risk’ communities, that 
would require additional levels of education and resources (i.e., for sheltering and evacuating).  
 The methodology introduced in this thesis provides a framework for advancing the 
current Level 3 PRA technique to improve the accuracy of evacuation predictions through 
explicit incorporation of social factors. By incorporating social factors into evacuation models, 
more accurate estimations of travel time and road loading can be achieved. Through a more 
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realistic estimation of population evacuation time, dose accumulation calculations will closer 
reflect reality, thereby improving risk estimations. Through the integration of GIS and Level 3 
PRA, highly granular and location specific social categories can be created to reflect differing 
behaviors in response to nuclear power plant accidents. The methods introduced in this thesis 
advance the current approaches of population response in MACCS2 by considering location 
specific social factors that will affect behavior and decision making during evacuation and 
response.   
 Through the use of systematic methods for Level 3 PRA and social vulnerability, changes 
in EPPR can be used to determine the effects on risk.  Through the use of PRA, importance 
measures can be used to determine the critical social factors that will have an effect on the 
programmatic aspects of EPPR. In this thesis, social vulnerability is used as the underlying 
theory to assess the damage progression to population subgroups within the nuclear power 
plant’s Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).  Social vulnerability is used as a surrogate construct 
for detailed causal models in order to describe the influence of social, political, and economic 
factors on population behavior exposed to a NPP radiation hazard.  A social vulnerability index 
(SVI) is used to quantify the level of damage susceptibility (or evacuation inefficiency) for a 
specific demographic group. 
 Risk mapping has been demonstrated as a practical application for explicitly integrating 
social factors with Level 3 PRA.  The case study of a radiological hazard due to a long-term 
station blackout (LTSBO) was produced using WinMACCS, and imported into a spatial analysis 
environment using ArcGIS.  SVI was calculated for census block groups within the plume 
exposure EPZ in ArcGIS.  A geospatial environment facilitates the integration of hazard 
information and social vulnerability onto a common modeling platform, allowing for additional 
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spatial analysis to be performed. The results of integrated risk mapping allow for a more detailed 
understanding of how social vulnerability, and the subsequent changes to vulnerability, affects 
total risk in conjunction with the probabilistic hazard of a nuclear accident.  Specific to Surry 
Power Station (SPS), risk was ranked highest within 1 mile of the plant, and significantly lower 
outside of 1 mile.  Individual municipalities can use this to manage the range of risks contained 
in their geographic area.  This mapping, combined with statistical analysis, creates a quantitative 
measure to rank a variety of location-specific populations based on both probabilistic hazard and 
social vulnerability to the risk derived in chapter 4.   
 Updating emergency response parameters in WinMACCS was also shown using BBN.  
The relationships of the BBN were theoretically validated and provide a systematic view of 
underlying social vulnerability that would impact the quality of evacuation. The results of the 
BBN model show how much more or less likely a specific population is to evacuate, which can 
be used to update the non-evacuating cohort used in WinMACCS.  Sensitivity analysis also 
shows that certain factors play important roles in the generation of this likelihood to evacuate, 
given the specific demographic variables in each location.  Families with children, the elderly, 
and distance from the NPP were shown to have the greatest relevance for evacuation intention.  
Combining the relative risk ranking from risk mapping and sensitivity analysis from BBN could 
further allow for the development of a risk matrix of both risk rank and sensitivity. 
 This research represents an ongoing effort for integrating social factors in Level 3 PRA 
[10, 11].  The advancement of Level 3 PRA through the incorporation of social factors will have 
strategic and economic benefits for the nuclear industry and regulator. The state-of-the-art 
approach introduced in this thesis creates new opportunities for future research to develop more 
systematic and theory-based causal model of social factors influencing evacuation performances. 
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This will help develop explicit and internal incorporation of social factors into evacuation 
models of Level 3 PRA codes. Development of these theoretical causal models need 
multidisciplinary research and will require multidimensional collaboration among academia, 
regulatory and industry in order to create practical risk-informed solutions for nuclear power 
industry.  
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APPENDIX A: LEVEL 3 PRA ELEMENTS 
A.1 SOURCE TERM 
 A Level 3 PRA starts with the source of hazard that is affecting the environment and 
population.  The hazard is present after the consequence in the Level 2 PRA (modeling Large 
Early Release Frequency; LERF).  Depending on the scope of the study, the detailed analysis on 
what was released (i.e., the source term) may be developed in the Level 2 PRA.  A stand-alone 
Level 3 PRA study may also involve the development of the source term, and so, in order to be 
comprehensive regarding the inputs to a Level 3 PRA, source term characteristics will be 
addressed here. 
 The source term is defined as: “the quantity and isotopic composition of released 
radionuclides, together with their physical and chemical characteristics, the heat content of the 
plume, the time profile of the release, and the release height.  Generally, the source term also 
includes the frequency of release.” [2, p. 3]  As Figure 2.2 illustrated, this is used as an input and 
is required as a basic element in the consequence analysis.  Depending on the consequence 
software used (see Chapter 3), (i) the source term development may be directly calculated within 
the Level 3 PRA code, (ii) may require an input file derived from a Level 2 PRA code, or (iii) 
may have a more continuous process by which a Level 2 PRA code will interface with the Level 
3 PRA code without requiring action from the analyst.   
 Finally, because a comprehensive Level 3 PRA study will consider many different 
accident types, multiple source terms should be calculated for each accident scenario.  Actual 
quantities of radionuclides and other variables, such as time of release, energy of the release, 
height of release, and accident frequency, are all anticipated to differ depending on the accident 
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scenario that is selected.  By considering all possible accident scenarios, the consequence 
determination can sample from each to obtain a representative source term, and probabilistically 
give a more realistic risk result, no matter which accident scenario actually takes place. 
 The actual release of the source term from the NPP, whether it is directly from the 
containment building or a bypass of the containment, will tend to rise vertically into the 
atmosphere due to initial vertical momentum and internal thermal energy.   This is known as 
plume rise [3].  Most of the various equations for plume rise are semi-empirical and based on an 
assumption of the structure of the equation and empirical determination of constants, and exhibit 
a large amount of uncertainty under different wind conditions.  The Briggs method [4] defines 
the plume rise height as: 
    ∆ℎ(𝑥) = 1.6 𝐹𝑏
1/3
𝑢−1𝑥2/3   (A.1) 
and, 
     𝐹𝑏 = 𝑔 𝑣𝑠 𝑟𝑠
2(𝑇𝑠 − 𝑇𝑎)/𝑇𝑠   (A.2) 
where: 
Δh  = Plume rise (m) 
u  = Wind speed (m/s) 
x  = Downwind distance (m) 
Fb = Buoyancy flux parameter (m
4
/s
3
) 
g  = Gravitational constant (m/s
2
) 
vs  = Vertical exit speed (m/s) 
rs  = Exit radius (m) 
Ts = Gas exit temperature (F) 
Ta =  Ambient temperature (F) 
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There are other semi-empirical based formulations of the plume rise parameter, but all include 
the above terms in their calculations. 
A.2 RADIOACTIVITY TRANSPORT, DIFFUSION, AND DISPERSION 
 The phenomenological process, after a source term is generated at the plant, is referred to 
as transport and diffusion.  The most simplistic explanation of transport and diffusion is that a 
radiological plume produced on-site will travel downwind and spread over a large area over 
time.  The characteristics of the plume, where it travels, how concentrated it is by the time it 
reaches the population, and the nuclide losses between generation at the plant and reaching the 
public are all governed by deterministic equations involving specific parameters defined in the 
Level 3 PRA code.   
 The most common atmospheric dispersion model is the Gaussian plume model [1, 2].  In 
it, the plume is assumed to have a Gaussian concentration profile and travel in a straight line 
from the source.  A visualization of the Gaussian plume is given in Figure A.1. 
 
Figure A.1.  Gaussian plume in a wind-oriented coordinate system [3]. 
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 Zannetti [3] also gives the Gaussian plume formula in a general reference system: 
  𝑐 =  
𝑄
2𝜋𝜎ℎ𝜎𝑧|?⃑? |
𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
1
2
(
∆𝑐𝑤
𝜎ℎ
)
2
] ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
1
2
(
𝑧𝑠+∆ℎ−𝑧𝑟
𝜎𝑧
)
2
]  (A.3) 
where: 
c       = Concentration (Bq·s/m
3
) 
Q      = Source strength (Bq) 
σh     = Standard deviation – horizontal (m) 
σz     = Standard deviation – vertical (m) 
Δcw   = Crosswind distance between receptor and source (m) 
zr, zs = Vertical location of receptor and source (m) 
 While the assumptions of the above model are oversimplifications, the Gaussian shape 
has been found to be empirically accurate [2].  The time-independence of equation A.3 above 
can be updated with hourly meteorological data and modeled over a long period of time using 
multiple plume releases to account for changes in wind direction and speed and changes in the 
source term. 
 There are several other, more accurate and complex, models for atmospheric dispersion, 
including the segmented plume model [3], the Gaussian puff model [4], and long-range 
trajectory models [2].  However, the IAEA has concluded that the choice of the dispersion model 
was “found not to be a major contributor to the differences observed between the predictions…” 
of different consequence codes [2].  The Gaussian plume model is not computationally intense, 
and given the amount and quality of meteorological data as an input, there may be very 
negligible gains in accuracy by using a more complex model [2]. 
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 The Gaussian plume can be numerically simulated by Eulerian models and Lagrangian 
models.  The basic difference between the two models is that the Eulerian reference system is 
fixed while the Lagrangian reference system follows the atmospheric motion.  The Eulerian 
equation for atmospheric diffusion is [3]: 
𝜕〈𝑐〉
𝜕𝑡
= −?⃑? ∙ ∇〈c〉 + ∇ ∙ 𝑲∇〈c〉 + 𝑆     (A.4) 
where 
K = Turbulent diffusivity tensor 
S = Source/Sink term for the plume concentration 
Equation A.4 is based on the conservation of mass, and can be described with the three terms on 
the right-hand-side of the equation: the continuity term, the molecular diffusion term, and direct 
source/sink of nuclide concentration term. 
 Analytical solutions for special cases can be found in Zannetti [3], but sophisticated 
Level 3 PRA codes will numerically solve and sample equation 2.4 [3].  The Lagrangian 
equation is given by [3]: 
〈𝑐(𝑟, 𝑡)〉 =  ∫ ∫ 𝑝(𝑟, 𝑡|𝑟 ′, 𝑡′)𝑆(𝑟 ′, 𝑡′)𝑑𝑟′𝑑𝑡′
𝑡
−∞
    (A.5) 
where 
p() = Probability density function that an air parcel moves from (r’, t’) to (r, t) 
S() = Source term 
and the same process of numerical solutions and sampling can be completed within the PRA 
code. 
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 The process of transport and diffusion is further complicated by atmospheric deposition.  
Deposition acts as another phenomenon to decrease the concentration of a radiological release.  
Deposition comes in two varieties: dry deposition and wet deposition.  Dry deposition occurs 
when the plume comes into contact with materials that reduce the concentration before 
interacting with the population.  Wet deposition is the reduction in dispersing material due to 
precipitation or through atmospheric conditions (i.e. rainclouds) [2].  This is effectively how the 
atmosphere cleans itself of impurities [3].  A pictorial representation of many of these 
environmental phenomena is shown in Figure A.2. 
 
Figure A.2. Atmospheric Dispersion Phenomena [5]. 
 There are many uncertainties within all atmospheric dispersion models and the 
parameters that are part of the deterministic equations that govern these models.  In order to be 
accurate, adding a layer of uncertainty and sampling using Monte Carlo or Latin Hypercube 
sampling adds realistic bounds to the final consequences calculated from the PRA code.  
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 One of the parameters that is essential for a consequence study at this level, in order to 
actually be probabilistic, is representative sampling of meteorological data.  The “scenario-
based” aspect of a Level 3 PRA is reduced to running different iterations of the same accident, 
given different weather patterns.  The meteorological data that is collected should be as close, 
proximity-wise, to the plant as possible in order to obtain the best representation of weather at 
that specific location.  Sometimes this is the meteorological station nearest to the plant; other 
times this data is collected directly at the plant.  Averaged “typical” weather for different 
seasons, or day and night can be used; the most accurate consequence codes use random 
sampling methods of hourly weather data in order to obtain the most inclusive of all probable 
weather conditions.   
 The result after transport, diffusion, and deposition is that radioactive contaminants have 
been modeled to reach people, crops, and livestock and other farm animals in the local area. The 
dispersion of the source term reduces the concentrations that the population, animals, and crops 
encounter, but the original strength of the source term (largely dependent on the size of accident 
and accident type) requires more analysis in order to calculate the actual radiological risk. 
A.3 EXPOSURE PATHWAYS 
 The process by which humans are affected by nuclear radiation can be one of many.  
Typically, six principal pathways are used [2]: 
1. External irradiation from radioactive material in the passing plume referred to as 
cloudshine; 
2. External irradiation from radioactive material deposited on the ground, referred to as 
groundshine; 
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3. External irradiation from radioactive material deposited on skin and clothing; 
4. Internal irradiation from radioactive material inhaled from the passing plume; 
5. Internal irradiation from radioactive material inhaled following resuspension of the 
ground deposit; 
6. Internal irradiation from radioactive material ingested following the contamination of 
foodstuffs by radioactive material. 
 These principal pathways are illustrated in Figure A.3.   
 
Figure A.3. Principal exposure pathways to humans following an atmospheric release. [2] 
 External irradiation directly from the plume, known as cloudshine, contains both β and γ 
particles that contribute to external exposure.  In most mathematical models, the plume is treated 
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as semi-infinite (semi-infinite cloud approximation), and is calculated at a height of 1m for a 
person standing at ground level [6].  The semi-infinite cloud approximation is often used and 
modified by a geometrical correction factor over a numerical evaluation of a finite cloud to save 
computing time [2].  The dose rates for both β and γ radiation are given [7] in equations A.6 and 
2.7. 
?̇?𝛽,𝑎𝑖𝑟,∞ =  𝑘 ∙ ∑ ?̅?𝛽,𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝛽,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑘 ∙ ?̅?𝛽,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙   (A.6) 
?̇?𝛾,𝑎𝑖𝑟,∞ =  𝑘 ∙ ∑ 𝐸𝛾,𝑖 ∙ 𝑦𝛾,𝑖𝑖      (A.7) 
where 
?̇?𝛽,𝑎𝑖𝑟,∞ = Beta dose rate in air (Gy·sec
-1
/Bq·m
-3
) 
?̇?𝛾,𝑎𝑖𝑟,∞ = Gamma dose rate in air (Gy·sec
-1
/Bq·m
-3
) 
k  = Constant based on the density of air 
Eγ,i  = Photon energy per disintegration (MeV/dis) 
Ēβ,i  = Average β-energy per disintegration (MeV/dis) 
Ēβ,total  = Average β-energy for all decay modes (MeV) 
pβ,i  = Number of β-particles emitted per disintegration 
yγ,i  = Number of photons emitted per disintegration 
Due to their short range in air and limited penetration, β-particles are sometimes neglected [2].   
 Groundshine is the result of radioactive material being deposited through dry or wet 
deposition, and will act as a point, line, or plane source depending on the geometry of the 
deposited material.  This pathway is often evaluated using a “dose per deposit conversion 
factor,” given in Sv·s-1·Bq-1·m2 [2].   Groundshine is also only applicable for people who are 
outdoors, so shielding factors must be used for those who are inside buildings. 
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 Radioactive deposition on skin and clothing poses a real concern, and is the last external 
pathway of irradiation.  Often skin and clothing deposition is taken as a fraction of that deposited 
on the ground and uses a pre-calculated dose per unit activity using clothing as a shielding factor 
[2].  These calculations are based on skin thickness, total body surface, and weight of clothing 
[7]. 
 While the plume passes an area, the people are exposed to cloudshine and are directly 
inhaling the radionuclides which cause internal irradiation.  The dose calculation for inhalation is 
heavily weighted toward breathing rate.  This depends on age and level of physical activity [1, 
4].  The standard value for breathing rate is 2.66 × 10
-4
 m
3
/s.  This is the average of light activity 
sixteen hours a day (≈3.33 × 10-4 m3/s) and eight hours of resting (≈9.03 × 10-5 m3/s) [6].   
 The other way that radioactivity can be inhaled is through resuspension.  The material 
that had originally been deposited on the ground becomes airborne once again due to some 
physical disturbance.  The calculations for this type of inhalation are the same as above, but have 
a “time-dependent resuspension factor [2].” 
 The final exposure pathway is through ingestion.  The Reactor Safety Study and 
NUREG-2300 [6] go into detail on sources of ingestion and periods of hazard.  These have been 
integrated into Level 3 PRA codes by the use of food chain models.   
 The first period of ingestion hazard comes from direct deposition on vegetation or 
animals that are consumed by people.  Short-lived nuclides have the greatest effect on internal 
dose during this period.  The second mechanism is through long-term exposure by the uptake of 
radioactive material deposited in the soil through vegetation roots; or further down the food 
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chain, such as through the consumption of milk.  This second period of exposure contributes 
much less than the first [6]. 
 Through these six different exposure pathways, the people affected by an NPP accident 
accumulate an external and internal radiation dose.  Countermeasures, such as shelter-in-place 
(to reduce external dose) and potassium iodide (KI) pills (to reduce internal dose to the thyroid) 
can greatly affect the total dose, and can be modeled in sophisticated consequence software. 
A.4 POPULATION RESPONSE 
 After an NPP site declares General Emergency, as described in chapter 1, the population 
inside the boundary of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) will be required to evacuate.  This 
evacuation needs to be taken into account when calculating dose, since this is by far the most 
significant protective action against a radiological hazard.  How the evacuation is modeled 
depends on how refined the PRA software is for accurately predicting population behavior. 
 Two main evacuation areas can be issued to the public: within a certain radius, or a 
keyhole evacuation that includes a radius, and further downwind.  A staged keyhole evacuation 
has been shown to be one of the most beneficial preventative measures [8].  An example of a 
keyhole evacuation is shown in Figure A.4.  The plant is located at the center, the radius directly 
around the plant may be a five-mile evacuation zone, and the remaining white area is ten miles 
downwind.  Everywhere else within ten miles is voluntary evacuation, and outside the ten- mile 
EPZ are those people who decided to evacuate despite the fact that they were not directed to do 
so. 
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Figure A.4. Keyhole evacuation [9]. 
 Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) will include evacuation scenarios to include keyhole 
evacuations.  These areas are then simulated as the population leaves.  Radial evacuation 
simulation (all movement is radially outward) and network evacuation simulation (traffic 
movement follows major roadways) are two major simulation techniques. 
 These evacuation patterns can be simulated with either microscopic models or 
macroscopic models.  Microscopic models simulate and move each individual vehicle through 
traffic, and each vehicle has its own characteristics and can respond to its surroundings.  
Macroscopic models simulate overall traffic flow and not individual vehicles.  While 
microscopic models give a more detailed simulation, this is at the cost of computing speed.  A 
comparison of microscopic and macroscopic modeling was conducted for Nine Mile Point 
Nuclear Generating Station, and the models produced less an a 5 percent difference in evacuation 
time estimates, but the microscopic model took 300 times longer [9]. 
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 A radial evacuation pattern is the simplest to simulate.  All evacuating portions of the 
population will exit the EPZ at the same rate, radially outward, until all have evacuated to an 
area outside of the EPZ.  While this would be the best method for evacuation to mitigate dose 
accumulation, it is far from realistic.  A network evacuation simulation dictates the direction of 
traffic based on which direction the major roads travel.  There is more pre-processed information 
in this simulation, requiring the analyst to determine the direction of movement at each location 
around the plant.  The computer processing time may increase slightly, but this method of 
network evacuation modeling is recommended in order to give a better and more conservative 
estimate of time for evacuation than that of a radial evacuation [2].   
A.5 CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS 
 After careful consideration of all of the elements to a Level 3 PRA, it is important to not 
get lost in the details, and to remember the purpose of this level of PRA.  The goal is to calculate 
the health effects and the economic consequences to the surroundings due to a nuclear power 
plant accident.  This research only considers health risk and not economic risk, but the same 
process described in this appendix is applicable for calculating economic costs associated with 
displaced households, closed businesses, and land decontamination. 
 The NRC is concerned about early fatality risk and latent cancer fatalities.  The NRC 
Safety Goal for prompt fatalities represents a 5 × 10
-7
 per year objective, while the latent cancer 
fatalities goal is currently 2 × 10
-6
 per year [10].  The development and implementation of the 
source term, plume rise, dispersion, exposure pathways, and evacuation scenarios all lead to dose 
to an individual.  Health physics determines what amount of dose in a given period will develop 
early fatalities and latent cancers.    
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APPENDIX B: WINMACCS RESULTS 
Table B.1. Peak dose to the critical organ (L-ICRP60ED) as defined in SOARCA for the first six radial rings. 
Peak dose (Sv) to L-ICRP60ED at each grid cell 
Angle Index 
(Starting N, 
rotating 
clockwise 
0.0km – 0.16km 0.16km – 0.52km 0.52km – 1.21km 1.21km – 1.61km 1.61km – 2.13km 2.13 km – 3.22km 
1 0.6271 0.1054 0.03726 0.02107 0.01542 0.009944 
2 0.6675 0.1135 0.03854 0.02167 0.01577 0.01004 
3 0.7027 0.1233 0.04145 0.0232 0.01672 0.01062 
4 0.7311 0.1347 0.04478 0.0247 0.0176 0.01114 
5 0.7677 0.1478 0.04974 0.02774 0.01981 0.01258 
6 0.7766 0.153 0.05248 0.02908 0.02087 0.01327 
7 0.7719 0.1508 0.05191 0.02888 0.02081 0.01326 
8 0.7555 0.1424 0.04809 0.0269 0.01947 0.0124 
9 0.7151 0.1269 0.04295 0.02429 0.01771 0.01122 
10 0.6876 0.1142 0.03947 0.02274 0.01691 0.01089 
11 0.6407 0.1043 0.0373 0.02196 0.01643 0.01065 
12 0.5966 0.09509 0.03371 0.01959 0.01449 0.009301 
13 0.5664 0.09022 0.03135 0.01804 0.01348 0.00864 
14 0.5323 0.088 0.03111 0.01785 0.01332 0.008707 
15 0.5109 0.0873 0.03129 0.01796 0.0133 0.008804 
16 0.4957 0.0858 0.03022 0.01711 0.01262 0.008246 
17 0.474 0.08308 0.02871 0.01594 0.01168 0.007494 
18 0.4624 0.08161 0.0285 0.01615 0.01187 0.007632 
19 0.4462 0.07927 0.02793 0.01599 0.01179 0.007599 
20 0.4379 0.07787 0.02682 0.01524 0.01116 0.007283 
21 0.4289 0.07599 0.02561 0.01448 0.01064 0.006855 
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22 0.4181 0.07445 0.025 0.01429 0.01038 0.006629 
23 0.4179 0.07337 0.02489 0.01416 0.01038 0.006739 
24 0.4239 0.07297 0.02408 0.01352 0.009987 0.006535 
25 0.4317 0.07355 0.02342 0.01304 0.009581 0.006255 
26 0.4569 0.08042 0.02613 0.01465 0.01074 0.006924 
27 0.4829 0.08962 0.03029 0.017 0.01236 0.007965 
28 0.5054 0.09848 0.03304 0.01847 0.01346 0.008621 
29 0.525 0.1021 0.03357 0.01848 0.01343 0.008459 
30 0.5206 0.1038 0.03395 0.01863 0.01343 0.008425 
31 0.5132 0.1032 0.03433 0.0189 0.01356 0.008448 
32 0.4981 0.09905 0.03323 0.01838 0.01307 0.008154 
33 0.4693 0.0883 0.02958 0.0166 0.01172 0.007306 
34 0.4323 0.07552 0.02461 0.01384 0.009832 0.006135 
35 0.3947 0.06293 0.02047 0.01142 0.008124 0.005011 
36 0.3731 0.05483 0.01765 0.009822 0.007005 0.004342 
37 0.3607 0.0533 0.01735 0.009638 0.006868 0.004222 
38 0.3502 0.05631 0.01876 0.01039 0.007394 0.004591 
39 0.3555 0.06178 0.02105 0.01167 0.008444 0.005302 
40 0.3685 0.06659 0.02243 0.01252 0.00907 0.00576 
41 0.3727 0.06839 0.02328 0.01306 0.009572 0.006172 
42 0.3765 0.06876 0.02293 0.01286 0.009538 0.006111 
43 0.3871 0.06775 0.02266 0.01256 0.009266 0.005873 
44 0.398 0.06713 0.02222 0.01233 0.008962 0.005742 
45 0.4208 0.06876 0.02247 0.0125 0.009034 0.005763 
46 0.444 0.07446 0.02412 0.01341 0.00976 0.006209 
47 0.4805 0.08749 0.02765 0.01533 0.0111 0.007159 
48 0.5206 0.1012 0.03323 0.01842 0.01322 0.008471 
49 0.5507 0.1144 0.03869 0.02141 0.01525 0.009605 
50 0.5795 0.1226 0.04215 0.02342 0.01675 0.01057 
51 0.5797 0.1228 0.04199 0.02329 0.01679 0.01091 
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52 0.5693 0.1151 0.03913 0.02181 0.01577 0.01028 
53 0.5534 0.1056 0.03527 0.01968 0.01428 0.009252 
54 0.5254 0.09476 0.03158 0.01765 0.01283 0.008116 
55 0.5039 0.08895 0.02967 0.01672 0.01219 0.007733 
56 0.4854 0.08656 0.02904 0.01643 0.01186 0.007524 
57 0.4754 0.08513 0.02881 0.01592 0.01153 0.007382 
58 0.4782 0.08658 0.0294 0.01658 0.01196 0.007761 
59 0.4834 0.08522 0.03009 0.01717 0.01266 0.008173 
60 0.4933 0.08458 0.02944 0.01708 0.01264 0.008134 
61 0.5166 0.08609 0.0297 0.01703 0.01263 0.008046 
62 0.5371 0.08933 0.03122 0.01782 0.01305 0.008355 
63 0.5606 0.09447 0.03349 0.01917 0.01411 0.0091 
64 0.6001 0.09989 0.03515 0.02 0.01484 0.009635 
 
Table B.2. Peak dose to the critical organ (L-ICRP60ED) as defined in SOARCA for radial rings 7-12. 
Peak dose (Sv) to L-ICRP60ED at each grid cell 
Angle Index 
(Starting N, 
rotating 
clockwise 
3.22km – 4.02km 4.01km – 4.83km 4.83km – 5.63km 5.63km – 8.05km 8.05km – 
11.27km 
11.27km – 
16.09km 
1 0.006719 0.00505 0.004 0.002645 0.001578 0.0008491 
2 0.006896 0.005191 0.004059 0.002702 0.001604 0.0008682 
3 0.007258 0.005451 0.004234 0.002746 0.001646 0.0008879 
4 0.007569 0.005721 0.004469 0.002875 0.001676 0.0008922 
5 0.008561 0.006504 0.005138 0.003366 0.001984 0.001103 
6 0.009045 0.006868 0.005431 0.003553 0.002148 0.001209 
7 0.009053 0.006844 0.005385 0.003581 0.002207 0.001221 
8 0.008511 0.006452 0.005051 0.003353 0.002033 0.001063 
9 0.007806 0.005856 0.00459 0.002954 0.001734 0.0009034 
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10 0.007523 0.005679 0.004468 0.002847 0.001694 0.0009402 
11 0.007311 0.005521 0.004363 0.002831 0.001651 0.000899 
12 0.006413 0.004837 0.003807 0.002446 0.001419 0.0007446 
13 0.005992 0.004543 0.003585 0.00229 0.001362 0.0007367 
14 0.006045 0.004565 0.0036 0.002396 0.001432 0.0007446 
15 0.006178 0.004672 0.003676 0.00244 0.001476 0.0008142 
16 0.005826 0.004405 0.003436 0.002241 0.001374 0.0007869 
17 0.005264 0.003937 0.003068 0.001975 0.00115 0.0006603 
18 0.005293 0.003996 0.003161 0.002091 0.00126 0.0006977 
19 0.005293 0.00404 0.003224 0.002168 0.001323 0.0007267 
20 0.005069 0.003883 0.003105 0.002111 0.001263 0.0006712 
21 0.004828 0.003706 0.002942 0.001945 0.001146 0.0006288 
22 0.004711 0.003656 0.002913 0.00189 0.00111 0.0006135 
23 0.004734 0.003653 0.002916 0.00194 0.001154 0.0006505 
24 0.004573 0.003525 0.002806 0.001868 0.001115 0.0006117 
25 0.004432 0.003386 0.002673 0.001752 0.001032 0.0005302 
26 0.004878 0.003775 0.002987 0.001901 0.001108 0.0005924 
27 0.005517 0.0042 0.003342 0.002196 0.001296 0.000697 
28 0.005951 0.00445 0.003491 0.002313 0.001352 0.000738 
29 0.005794 0.004298 0.003351 0.002161 0.001288 0.0007142 
30 0.005689 0.004339 0.003358 0.002201 0.001304 0.0007268 
31 0.005679 0.004278 0.003398 0.002284 0.001348 0.0007385 
32 0.00546 0.004152 0.00329 0.002187 0.001264 0.0006933 
33 0.00494 0.003731 0.002967 0.001915 0.001148 0.0006052 
34 0.00416 0.003142 0.002489 0.001602 0.0009297 0.0005095 
35 0.00343 0.002637 0.002053 0.001313 0.0007493 0.0004221 
36 0.00298 0.00226 0.001763 0.001149 0.0006917 0.0003878 
37 0.002928 0.002238 0.001771 0.001163 0.0006913 0.0003691 
38 0.003174 0.002465 0.001947 0.001322 0.0007698 0.0004217 
39 0.003632 0.002811 0.002236 0.001481 0.0008859 0.0004875 
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40 0.003997 0.003063 0.002402 0.001565 0.0009258 0.0005005 
41 0.004201 0.003233 0.002528 0.001667 0.001013 0.0005452 
42 0.004134 0.003165 0.002502 0.001662 0.0009963 0.0005633 
43 0.003971 0.003042 0.002417 0.001586 0.0009563 0.0005225 
44 0.003928 0.002995 0.002408 0.001576 0.00096 0.000524 
45 0.004022 0.003101 0.002475 0.001607 0.0009823 0.0005603 
46 0.004341 0.003305 0.002629 0.001709 0.001015 0.0005671 
47 0.004972 0.003758 0.002956 0.001966 0.001174 0.0006646 
48 0.005771 0.004353 0.003465 0.002286 0.001444 0.0008678 
49 0.006538 0.004946 0.003892 0.002575 0.001651 0.0009995 
50 0.007208 0.005482 0.004346 0.002926 0.001856 0.001137 
51 0.007528 0.005684 0.004523 0.003061 0.001927 0.001129 
52 0.007189 0.005489 0.004352 0.002969 0.001921 0.001112 
53 0.006531 0.00497 0.003978 0.002671 0.00172 0.001013 
54 0.005698 0.004354 0.003489 0.002303 0.001439 0.0008597 
55 0.005344 0.004079 0.003215 0.002168 0.001362 0.0008165 
56 0.005183 0.003918 0.003129 0.002081 0.001321 0.00074 
57 0.005102 0.003859 0.003051 0.002046 0.00124 0.0006663 
58 0.005344 0.004037 0.003211 0.00218 0.001305 0.0007147 
59 0.005618 0.00421 0.003294 0.002209 0.001333 0.0007348 
60 0.005548 0.004139 0.003237 0.002143 0.00128 0.0006863 
61 0.005561 0.004233 0.00332 0.002167 0.001296 0.0007122 
62 0.005789 0.004405 0.00349 0.002232 0.001315 0.0007258 
63 0.006253 0.004758 0.003827 0.002499 0.001504 0.000817 
64 0.006525 0.004985 0.003975 0.002684 0.001596 0.0008773 
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APPENDIX C: GIS MODEL AND FULL PAGE MAPS 
 
Figure C.1. Overall structure of the model built in Model Builder in ArcGIS. 
 
Figure C.2. Section 1 of 5, from left to right (zoomed in). 
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Figure C.3. Section 2 of 5, from left to right (zoomed in). 
 
Figure C.4. Section 3 of 5, from left to right (zoomed in). 
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Figure C.5. Section 4 of 5, from left to right (zoomed in). 
 
Figure C.6. Section 5 of 5, from left to right (zoomed in). 
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Figure C.7. Social vulnerability within 10 miles of SPS. (Full page) 
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Figure C.8.Grid system developed in ArcGIS. (Full page) 
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Figure C.9. Visualization of radiation hazard around Surry Power Station due to LTSBO. (Full Page) 
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Figure C.10. Integrated risk map accounting for both hazard and vulnerability. (Full page) 
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Figure C.11. Integrated risk map determined by highest hazard per block group. (Full page) 
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APPENDIX D: BBN TRUTH TABLES 
Table D.1. Location 
Total Population Low High 
Distance from NPP Close Far Close Far 
Less likely to evacuate 0.375 1 0 0.625 
More likely to evacuate 0.625 0 1 0.375 
 
Table D.2. Stage in life cycle 
Residents > 65 Few Many 
Residents < 18 Few Many Few Many 
Less likely to evacuate 0.5 0 1 0.5 
More likely to evacuate 0.5 1 0 0.5 
 
Table D.3. Social Status 
Mobile Homes Few Many 
Average house value Low High Low High 
Low 0.4 0 1 0.6 
High 0.6 1 0 0.4 
 
Table D.4 Nuclear Power Attitude 
Location Less likely More likely 
Stage in life (age) Less likely More likely Less likely More likely 
Social Status Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Negative 1 0.76 0.62 0.38 0.62 0.38 0.24 0 
Positive 0 0.24 0.38 0.62 0.38 0.62 0.76 1 
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Table D.5. Risk Perception 
Location Less likely More likely 
Stage in life 
(age) 
Less likely More likely Less likely More likely 
 
Less likely More likely 
 
Social 
Status 
Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Nuclear 
power 
attitude 
- + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + 
Low risk 
perception 
0.38 0.88 0.5 1 0.81 0.69 0.31 0.81 0.19 0.69 0.31 0.81 0 0.5 0.12 0.62 
High risk 
perception 
0.62 0.12 0.5 0 0.19 0.31 0.69 0.19 0.81 0.31 0.69 0.19 1 0.5 0.88 0.38 
 
Table D.6. Evacuation Intention (first half) 
Location Less likely 
Stage in life 
(age) 
Less likely More likely 
Social 
Status 
Low High  Low  High 
Risk 
Perception 
Low risk High risk Low risk High risk Low risk High risk Low risk High risk 
Nuclear 
power 
attitude 
- + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + 
No 0.69 0.94 0.19 0.44 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.60 0.85 0.10 0.35 0.65 0.90 0.15 0.40 
Yes 0.31 0.06 0.81 0.56 0.25 0.00 0.50 0.25 0.40 0.15 0.90 0.65 0.35 0.10 0.85 0.60 
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Table D.7. Evacuation Intention (second half) 
Location More likely 
Stage in life 
(age) 
Less likely More likely 
Social 
Status 
Low High  Low  High 
Risk 
Perception 
Low risk High risk Low risk High risk Low risk High risk Low risk High risk 
Nuclear 
power 
attitude 
- + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + 
No 0.59 0.84 0.09 0.34 0.65 0.90 0.40 0.65 0.50 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.55 0.80 0.05 0.30 
Yes 0.41 0.16 0.91 0.66 0.35 0.10 0.60 0.35 0.50 0.25 1.00 0.75 0.45 0.20 0.95 0.70 
 
